

Theory and Interdisciplinarity in CDA

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CDA and values: Interdisciplinarity as a critical turn

Abstract

The perceived need for interdisciplinarity in CDA is a latter-day characteristic of most social science. It highlights the fragmenting trajectory that studies of the social world have undergone, especially over the last 140 years. After the attack, first by the French socialists, then by Marx, on neoclassical economics, political economy began to narrow its claims to the point at which “value” became identical with “price”. Originally, though, political economists believed that they had discovered

an elucidation of natural law, and that its scope extended to all of man’s [*sic*] dealing with man and nature. It was therefore a moral science governing man’s social activity, much the sort of thing that John Locke once hoped to achieve for ethics by applying to that subject the laws discovered by his friend Newton. (Neill, 1949, p. 537).

The eventual withering of political economy into a science of price left a rather large semantic residue of values unaccounted for — aesthetic, cognitive, social, and moral values, for example. These were taken up, in the first instance, by the newly emerging fields of sociology (eugenics), psychology, anthropology, and by “the philosophers of value”, an opportunistically invigorated branch of ethics. Later, after the first World War, the study of “values” fragments further into the fields of propaganda studies, political science, public opinion, public relations, and “general semantics”, among others.

My historical research into value as a “technical” concept - that is, as the focus of continually fragmenting formal intellectual disciplines - underpins my approach to analysing how values are realised and propagated in discourse. Indeed, the fragmenting historical trajectory in studies of value is itself a noteworthy discursive phenomenon. It is intimately involved in, and exemplary of, the trajectory of the capitalist system as it continues to fragment, colonise, enclose, and commodify increasingly intimate aspects of human activity, including forms of thought and language themselves. A move towards interdisciplinarity in social research, then, can be seen as an intrinsically critical movement in and of itself. Conversely, it may also isolate and further fragment research. It is this tension I investigate here.

CDA and values: Interdisciplinarity as a critical turn

Introduction

I have argued elsewhere that as capital evolves as a system of social organisation, more intimate and ephemeral aspects of humanity are formally appropriated and commodified, to the point at which language and thought have become the most valuable and predominant commodities in technologically “advanced” societies (Graham, 2000). What also appears to be the case, and this is not so surprising, is that “technical” understandings of value have changed to accommodate, or account for, or perhaps facilitate the most intimate forms of commodification that dominate today’s “global economy”. A study of how value has changed as a technical concept necessitates inter-disciplinary work. The approach highlights some advantages and pitfalls I have discovered in my own work on evaluation. I have given an overview here of the trajectory and content of my analytical approach for your interest and comment. It is still, of course, a work in progress.

Overview

Part of the difficulty in dealing with value and evaluations in text is finding categories to work with that do not impose themselves on the data *a priori*. Following are some very broad categories that, I think, capture what has underpinned technical assumptions about *the source* of value since about the mid-seventeenth century.

The first thing to understand is that these are not categories of value – I will outline some of those later on here – they are categories that have helped me organise the assumptions of value theorists over the centuries. They are organised into what look like binary opposites. But they are meant more as clines. Moreover, it is very rare that any of these paired groupings of value assumptions appear in technical discourse about value in “pure” form. That is to say, most theoretical construals of value embody some aspect of *all* these categories, almost by necessity. As is usual with artefacts of language, in this case the historical discussion about the source and nature of “value”, the argument tends towards objectification, no matter where it starts in this mini-system. I suggest that this system be seen as describing points on a sphere that trigger each other depending on where one “enters” the system of value assumptions¹.

1. Objective – value exists separately from what people do;
2. Subjective – value is a product of human agency;
3. Individual – value is a property or product of individual persons;
4. Social – value is a property or product of social activity;
5. Static – value is unchanging, immutable, and eternal;
6. Dynamic – value is in constant flux;
7. Exogenous – value is assumed to act “upon” humanity from some outside source;
8. Endogenous – value is assumed as a force produced from within humanity itself.

¹ Kind of like those toy static electricity globes that you put your hand on and they light up according to where you touch them ...

Clearly, the extremes outlined here are redolent of particular extreme stances taken and defended in social science. Again, that is no surprise since it is from social science and the humanities that I have derived these categories. So much for the categories into which theoretical assumptions about value can be thrown for convenience. The usefulness of these will become more obvious later. Now to technical conceptions of value put forward throughout recent history.

A brief history of value as a technical concept

Since it is such a contentious and much fought over concept in human history, there is no shortage of commentary on value as concept or a “thing”. What follows is a very brief summary of the historical research into value in which I am currently engaged (and which, thankfully, is almost finished).

Value, as it appears in the language that people speak and write is only partial, as well as partially overt: it is only a small part of a much larger story. Underneath these surface expressions lies historical infusions of conflicting and contradictory value systems, a substrate which is far more elusive than lexis or grammar. Value is always social. The concept of social value extends to the normative practices of institutions, to those of particular groups of people, and, of course, to specific individuals. Value is defined by specific people and its definition is propagated by many and various means (hanging “coin clippers” and suchlike in the case of Locke and Newton’s association with the Royal Mint). The current trend of reducing all values to expressions of price make the crudest statements of value possible: ‘Some people are more valuable than others’ (American Broadcasting Corporation, 1978, in Bagdikian, 1997, p. 114). It is against such a background of strong “economic rationalist” and eugenic conceptions of society that I write this paper, at a time when the idea of more and less valuable people has become, once again, as overtly institutionalised as the price system itself, giving rise, amongst other equally heinous phenomena, to the most dramatic increase in slavery since the American slave trade was at its peak (Bales, 1999). Further, the very notion of value has, for all intents and purposes, become synonymous with price, at least in the public sphere. My research is as much an antithetical reaction to this state of affairs as it is an exercise that points to method of analysis in a much wider sphere of values than is currently on offer in the public sphere of a mass mediated politics of consensus.

Political economy

Political economy was the first field in which “‘value” became a technical term’ (Langworthy Taylor, 1895, p. 414). Technicalisation notwithstanding, ‘[t]he idea connoted by the term “value” is intimately associated with the most remote experiences of the human race. Ever since it has been possible to predicate desirability of anything, have values existed’ (p. 414). This is a definition of “value” in the broadest and most abstract terms: the predication of *desirability*.

Looked at from one perspective, ‘the historical evolution of the value debate became locked into a centuries old dialectical conflict between the objective and subjective approaches’ (Fogarty, 1996). Like most of our conceptions, theories of value in political economy very much reflect the socio-historical circumstances surrounding their production. All theories of value contain subjective and objective aspects, but some, like those of the early mercantilists, and those of the later Austrian school, take up extreme positions along the subjective ⇔ objective cline.

The late mercantilist and early liberal theorists held an objective view of value: ‘intrinsic value’ was to be found in precious metals (Locke, 1696). Furthermore, value and power were identical to the mercantilist economic mind (Viner, 1948). This was the period during which ‘the serviceability to power of economic warfare, the possibility of using military power to achieve immediate economic

ends, and the possibilities of substituting economic power for military power' were developed for the first time in an elaborate and systematic manner (Viner, 1948, p. 8). This was reflected in the prevailing attitudes to people and the world in general:

For, since the introduction of the new artillery of powder guns, &c., and the discovery of wealth in the Indies, &c. war is become rather an expense of money than men, and success attends those that can most and longest spend money: whence it is that prince's [*sic*] armies in Europe are become more proportionable to their purses than to the number of their people; so that it uncontrollably follows that a foreign trade managed to best advantage, will make our country so strong and rich, that we may command the trade of the world, the riches of it, and consequently the world itself. (Bolingbroke, 1752, quoted in Viner, 1948).

Lord Bolingbroke's statement captures the excesses of hard-line mercantilist hyperbole very neatly: people are merely an object of wealth; wealth was seen to exist externally to people and to whole nations; and, it is the single lever of power by which the whole world might be controlled. Further, the intrinsic value of particular classes of people were immutable, and their purpose was seen to be collective:

In this view, members of society did not interact with each other, but rather participated, one with another, in England's collective enterprise of selling surplus goods abroad. As in a company, the administration was formal. There was little of Adam Smith's awareness of individuals with personal motives working purposively on their own. Rather economic writers approached the problem of promoting national growth much as a factory foreman might view meeting a production quota. (Appleby, 1976, p. 501)

The social expression of the mercantilist mindset was quite straightforward:

The rich were expected to buy their luxuries, the poor to have enough to subsist [...] With such a model at the back of their heads, these writers elaborated schemes for putting the poor to work. Houses for the "orderly management of the poor" was a favorite theme. (Appleby, 1976, p. 501)

The possibility of rising levels of equality and wealth was 'unthought of, if not unthinkable' (1976, p. 501). Two readily identifiable pressures combined to bring the mercantilist worldview to an ostensible end: rising costs in maintaining a colonial military presence on the part of mercantilist nations (Graham, in press), and the rising tide of political and economic liberalism which posited the values of freedom and equality for all people (Appleby, 1976, p. 515).

This shift brought about myriad problems, not the least of which was an emphasis on increased consumption. But our concern here is with assumptions about value. Subjective value first enters mainstream economic thought with Adam Smith (1776/1997, 1776/1999) in England and the physiocratic school in France, led by Quesnay.² This is the period in history where the dialectic between objective and subjective values emerges in a formal sense. The physiocrats, while accepting that labour, by which I mean human activity, adds value in some way, assumed that value inhered primarily in 'land and land rents' (Hobsbawm, 1962, p. 26). The early English theorists of mercantilist manufacturing, eventually attacked, and briefly superseded, by Smith and his inheritors, assumed that labour acted as a catalyst to release the value which inhered objectively in raw

² Before these founders of modern political economy, whose labour theories of value remain the staple for economists to this day, we see a transitional period during which labour enters as a crude element of production, a mere adjunct to the objective values found in nature or in manufacturing. I have no time to go into the details here ****

materials and manufacturing equipment. This view led to some of the complexities that still remain for political economy to deal with:

Labour seems to be a very simple category. The notion of labour in this universal form, as labour in general, is ... extremely old. Nevertheless “labour” in this simplicity is economically considered just as modern a category as the relations which give rise to this modern abstraction. The Monetary System, for example, still regards wealth quite objectively as a thing existing existing independently in the shape of money. Compared with this standpoint, it was a substantial advance when the Manufacturing or Mercantile system transferred the source of wealth from the object to subjective activity —mercantile or industrial labour— but it still considered that only this circumscribed activity itself produced money. In contrast to this system, the Physiocrats assume that a specific form of labour —agriculture— creates wealth, and they see the object no longer in the guise of money, but as a product in general, as the result of universal labour ...

It was an immense advance when Adam Smith rejected all restrictions with regard to the activity that produces wealth – for him it was all labour as such, neither manufacturing, nor commercial, nor agricultural labour, but all types of labour. (Marx, 1970, p. 209)

Here, when Smith enters, the expression of purely subjective - active - value emerges for the first time (even though Locke acknowledge the role of labour in extracting value): for Smith, ‘the wealth of nations’ is the work of people, even though he sees them as qualitatively cattle-like (Smith, 1776/1997, p. 100):

Labour was the first price, the original purchase money that was paid for all things. It was not by gold or by silver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased; and its value, to those who possess it, and who want to exchange it for some new productions, is precisely equal to the quantity of labour which it can enable them to purchase or command.

Wealth, as Mr Hobbes says, is power. (Smith, 1776/1997, p. 135)

Leaving aside the various developments, misunderstandings, and perversions of Smith’s thesis through, most notably, Ricardo in England and J.B. Say in France, Marx’s (1970, 1973, 1976, 1978, 1981) approach to value remains unique in political economy for its attempt to reconcile objective and subjective aspects of value without reducing the assumptions of one to the other in order to explain it. Surprisingly, Marx is often attributed as the author of the labour theory of value, but that is just not true: ‘Labour is *not the source* of all wealth. *Nature* is just as much the source of use values (and it is surely of such that material wealth consists!) as labour, which itself is only the manifestation of a force of nature, human labour power (Marx, 1875/1972, p. 382).

Marx, like Aristotle and Smith, distinguished between use-value and exchange-value (*e.g.* 1976, pp. 153-167), concluding that values are merely the social expression of relations between more and less valued people, and groups of people, which are hidden ‘under a material shell’ of commodities (*e.g.* 1843/1975; 1976, p. 167). For the purposes of this paper, though, Marx’s key comment about value is this:

Value ... does not have its description branded on its forehead; it rather transforms every product of labour into a social hieroglyphic. Later on, men [*sic*] try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of their own social product: for the characteristic which objects of utility have of being values is as much men’s social product as is their language. The belated scientific discovery that the products of labour, in so far as they are values, are merely the material expressions of the human labour expended to produce them, marks an epoch in the history of mankind’s development, but by no means banishes the objectivity possessed by the social characteristics of labour. (1976, p. 167)

For Marx, what we call “value” is a product of dynamic interaction between our subjective endogenous and individual, and objective exogenous and social modes of existence, all of which are mediated and refracted through the dynamic normative frameworks of socio-historical environments. Humans tend, he argues, to obscure and objectify these interactive processes where values are concerned, whether economic or otherwise (1846/1972, p. 118).

Marx’s expansiveness, although never equalled, was by no means immediately abandoned in political economy. And while the ‘utility curves’ of the Austrian school of economics, a staple of modern econometric theories of price, appear as early as 1870 (Langworthy Taylor, 1895, pp. 428-429) while Marx was still alive, a mere the debate as to the source and nature of value, though increasingly narrow in scope, continued beyond what today is considered to be the “economic” field. For Marx, “economy” is merely society viewed from a certain perspective (1981, p. 957). The analytical categories of labour, production, industry, trade, and value formed the basis of Marx’s economic discussions, but they did not obscure the broadest of social foundations of political economy’s subjective object: social interaction. This might just as easily be attributed to Marx’s historical perspective as to the historical development of economic thought itself.

The ‘moral science’

Prior to the physiocrats and the classical economists, economics was ‘generally treated as a branch of ethics or of politics’ (Neill, 1949, p. 532). With the liberal political and economic groundshifts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, an ‘intellectual revolution ... was directed against the traditional control of both Church and State over social activity’ (Neill, 1949, p. 532). Thus the intellectual revolution that was “the Enlightenment” also treated morality from an objective to a subjective category of value. The Church, and its close-knit association with a network of ordained Monarchies throughout Europe, provided an objective source, if not a coherent system, of moral and judicial values, responsibilities, obligations, and rights throughout much of mediaeval Europe. With the dawn of the “Age of Reason”, these objective sources of moral value perished, or at least were undermined to some significant degree (Neill, 1949, pp. 532-534). Hence morality became seen as a subjective activity, something that could be reasoned about, and universal moral truths deduced thereby. From the physiocrats through to Marx, a strong ethical and moral dimension forms a significant part of the assumptions in political economic thought.

In the physiocrats’ system, economics, morality, and science were melded into a ‘natural law of justice in its essence’ (Daire, 1846, in Neill, 1949, p. 535). Economics, the “moral economy”, and “civil society” were identical:

The Physiocrats, then, thought that they had discovered a new science, that it was an elucidation of natural law, and that its scope extended to all of man's dealing with man and nature. It was therefore a moral science governing man's social activity, much the sort of thing that John Locke once hoped to achieve for ethics by applying to that subject the laws discovered by his friend Newton. (Neill, 1949, p. 537)

However, over the next century and a half, the vicious effects of industrialisation failed to reflect the idealistic assertions of “natural justice”, a fact not lost on Marx and the French socialists who followed the physiocrats. Mainstream political economy responded, not by taking reality into account, but by slowly eliding it from the purview of economics, confining itself to the study of wealth, trade, and prices (Innis, 1944). By the late nineteenth century, after being increasingly ignored by political economy, social, judicial, moral, and cultural problems were eventually discarded

by political economy and subsumed under specialised intellectual frameworks; respectively: sociology, jurisprudence, moral philosophy, and anthropology.

The end of value and the triumph of price in political economy

The tendency of political economy to offer an exhaustive, socially grounded explanation of value collapsed after the pressure applied by Marx to the very concept of social value. Consequently, the journey towards a wholly subjective formulation of value has fairly much remained in dominance throughout the west since the late nineteenth century. The ‘Austrian school’ were the original authors of ‘subjective value theory’ (Sweezy, 1934). Members of this school are also called ‘utility theorists’ because they explain exchange-value - the phenomenon of price - in terms of use-value, or ‘utility’ (Langworthy Taylor, 1895; Sweezy, 1934). A corollary of, and indeed a catalyst for, this approach was the emergent discipline of psychology, with a heightened emphasis on psychological theories of pain, sacrifice, and pleasure being introduced into studies of value (*e.g.* Sweezy, 1934, p. 177). The main assumptions of subjective value theory are: i) that the focus for economic studies of value is the individual; ii) that the individual will always choose “correctly” in terms of his or her satisfaction, “correctly” not being understood here ‘ethically’, but rather ‘economically’ (Sweezy, 1934, p. 178); iii) that an individual ‘carries his [*sic*] pleasures and his exertions to the point where the margins of pleasure and of sacrifice correspond, so that the last increment of pleasure exactly repays the last dose of labor’ (Langworthy Taylor, 1895, p. 419), and; iv) that labour is always a measure of pain and sacrifice, and purchases are always an expression of the pleasurable satisfaction of desires (Langworthy Taylor, 1895; Sweezy, 1934).

At this point in the development of political economy, the effects of social factors - along with all ethical and other apparently non-economic factors - are almost entirely elided. Nevertheless economic studies still claimed, and indeed continues to claim, to explain the actions of whole societies, along with the actions of the ‘ordinary mind’ (Sweezy, 1934, p. 179; cf. also Saul, 1997; Thurow, 1996). That the economists have been almost unerringly wrong for over a century has not dampened their enthusiasm for abstract, individualistic, mathematical “models” of society (Sherden, 1998; Saul, 1992). This branch of economics, from the outset, resembles the Physiocrats in levels of dogmatism and abstraction. Evidence contrary to theory was, and still is, dismissed as “irrational”. The answer? A purely Hegelian “so much the worse for the facts!”:

Professor Strigl's basic device for freeing economics from the embarrassments of psychological and other kinds of empirical investigation is to be found in his distinction between the categories and the data of economic science. The categories are derived from the very fundamental fact of economics, or rather of economising, itself. Their validity is as general ... as any sort of human life we know about. From these categories, all the laws of pure economics can be deduced. (Sweezy, 1934, p. 180)

A reliance on deductive relationships between abstract categories, construed as immutable, universal economic laws produced an increasingly one-sided “science”. Recognising the one-sidedness of the subjective value theorists, Schumpeter (1909), most notably amongst others, put forward a conception of ‘social value’. At this point, arguments about the nature of value, which was becoming more entangled with the objectivity of price, becomes focused on the tension between the social and the individual. Schumpeter is clear that his formulation has ‘nothing whatsoever to do with the great problems of individualism and collectivism’, and that his concerns are ‘purely methodological’ (1909, p. 213). In his investigation of social value as a concept, Schumpeter, apparently suffering from economic myopia, asserts that modern theory ‘never spoke of social, but only of individual value’ (1909, p. 213). But individualism, he argues, is the correct mode of economic investigation: ‘we have

to start with the individual' because the reasoning of marginal utility 'cannot be directly applied to society as a whole' (p. 215). While Schumpeter concludes that social wants exist, such as the communal need for such things as battleships, social value, because it cannot by definition be subject to study through the methods of utility theory, is at best a useful metaphor. Again, the uncomfortable fact that individualistic theory does not and cannot explain social phenomena is used to rationalise the ultimate invalidity of a social theory *tout court* (1909, pp. 231-232). And this even though Schumpeter is recognised amongst his later followers as both a sociologist and an economist (Taylor, 1951). The circularity of subjective value theory (Sweezy, 1934), whether dogmatically individualistic or metaphorically social, along with its paradoxical focus on objectified abstract "things" (prices, demand, supply), appears to escape Schumpeter and his latter day acolytes.

The tautology of marginal value boils down to this: all values are the expressions of felt needs of some sort. These needs are measured against the pain of acquiring the means of their satisfaction and extinguishment. The resultant psychological predispositions of such interactions is "value", or to be precise, "marginal value". Whereas people can feel needs, society, having no psychology, nervous system, etc, *cannot*. Thus, society can *have* no needs, and therefore no values. The problem with reasoning with the theory of marginal value, then, is the problems created by an extremely subjective set of assumptions mixed with an extremely individualistic set of assumptions. If all values are expressions of individual needs, then society can have no needs and no values. Therefore, for the theory of marginal utility, there is no such thing as social values. Notice that at this point, history and relations of production have disappeared from economic theory. Along with these have gone society, which now appears as a mere abstraction, as nothing more than the sum of subjective individual needs. Thus the

tendency to find mental satisfaction in measuring everything by a fixed rational standard, and the way it takes for granted that everything can be related to everything else, certainly receives from the apparently objective value of money, and the universal possibility of exchange which this involves, a strong psychological impulse to become a fixed habit of thought ... (Innis, 1944, p. 82).

The historical result, though, is that, in 1942, it had become evident that

[t]he price system with its sterilizing power has destroyed ideologies and broken up irreconcilable minorities by compelling them to name their price. Unrestrained, it has destroyed its own ideology since it too has its price. In a sense religion is an effort to organize irrationality and as such appears in all large-scale organizations of knowledge (Innis, 1942, p. 4).

Marginal value has again become *the* dominant secular religion for the first time since the 1930s (cf. Hayek, 1980; Friedman & Friedman, 1980).

The semantic turn: Philosophies of value and the semantic residue of political economy

The increasing emphasis on price and money in mainstream economics, well documented by Innis (1942; 1944; 1951), left somewhat of a problem for economics: it left a *semantic* residue. Smith, Ricardo, Marx, and the Physiocrats had all attempted, to varying degrees of success, to develop a science of society as a whole, recognising the very real effects of all those aspects which were later to be excluded from the determination and meaning of value in political economy. A decisive semantic struggle ensued over the scope and meaning of value, and of what was to be done with its residual categories. To see the direction of value in a formal sense, it is worth looking to Perry (*e.g.* 1914, 1916), a representative of a philosophical school - the philosophers of subjective value - that initially emerged to fill the void left by extremely narrow and subjective theories of value in political economy. In a very real sense, the formalising of philosophies of value decisively

pronounces the death of a generic concept of value in political economy, and in doing so, it consigns the residue of “uneconomic” values to semantic realms of enquiry. In 1916, economics and the philosophy of value meet formally for the first time in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, ostensibly to identify potential commonalities. The effect, it seems, is to define boundaries:

I am certainly not using the term “value” in the sense which has recently been conventionalised for purposes of economics [as “wealth”] — and do not mean to. That sense is purely technical ... As respects terms, the situation is simply this. The term “value” is a more general term than “worth” or “good.” Such a term is indispensable if we are to disengage a generic idea or principle from the overwhelming variety and confusion of our world of praise and disparagement. Consider the ways in which a single object such as a book may be praised or disparaged. ... These various properties “cheap,” “mendacious,” “ignorant,” “edifying” and “crude,” differ characteristically as a group, from such other properties as the book’s color, weight, and size. They are the terms in which the book may be estimated, the predicates of *critical* judgement that may be pronounced upon it. We need the term “value” as a term to apply to all the predicates of this group. We may then speak of economic values, moral values, cognitive values, religious values and aesthetic values as various species of one genus. It follows that we should no longer speak of economics, after the manner of von Weiser as “treating the entire sphere of value phenomena”; but as one of the group of value sciences, having certain peculiar varieties of value as its province, and enjoying critical competence or authority only in its own restricted terms. (Perry, 1916, pp. 445-446, my emphasis)

Perry is clear that these various ‘species’ of values do not exist in isolation from one another, and that the ‘fruitfulness of grouping them together lies in the fact that there are fundamental principles common to them all, and in the fact that they perpetually interact’ (p. 446). However, he argues that even though they are ‘all functions of life’, and have ‘both a common source and innumerable threads of cross-connection’, certain of them are nevertheless ‘mutually independent in that there is no constant relation between them, either in quantity or in sign’ (p. 446). This is self-evident to Perry because ‘the same object may possess positive value in one sense, and negative value in another’ (p. 446). For instance, a ‘drug may increase in price at the same time that it grows more injurious to health’ (p. 446). And, ‘if economic commendation implied ethical commendation and in the same proportion, we should be dealing with only one type of value; but in as much as what is commended economically *may* be condemned ethically, there are, evidently, as we say, two standards’ (p. 446).

Perry is also clearly aware of the significant historical shift to a subjective view of value in economics, but his insight comes at the price of a fundamental elision:

Economic theory has steadily grown more psychological. It has long abandoned the naïve view that economic value is an inherent property of gold and silver. More recently it has abandoned the view that economic value is a sort of stamp or coating that things acquire in the course of their production, whether by agriculture or any form of labor. (p. 447)

This leaves a single realm of investigation, a point of ‘widespread agreement’ among economists and philosophers of value, ‘namely that values arise and have their being in the realm of emotion, desire, and will’ (p. 448). Here, Perry’s elision becomes apparent: the *social production process itself*, ‘the entire network of activities and artefacts with which societies reproduce themselves from every perspective, and at every level: materially, socially, relationally, mentally, *and* economically’ (Graham, 2000, p. 137). While these aspects appear to Perry as being necessarily interrelated, and related to conceptions of value, they appear to him as aspects belonging to separate realms of enquiry: ‘the philosopher of value, like the economic theorist, must carry his [*sic*] distinctions and his laws back in the last analysis to the dynamic aspect of mind, to that part of man, individual and social, with which he feels and acts’ (Perry, 1916, p. 448).

What Perry forestalls here, and it is continually suspended throughout most of the history of value in political economy, is that an individual's realm of "emotion, desire, and will" is as much a social product as factories, cities, money, and language. That is not a mechanical assertion of predetermination, nor an assertion of economic determinism. It is a rather simple statement of a self-evident, historical fact: the conditions into which humans are born, including the categories of mind; the social universe – work, values, culture, and beliefs; normative standards of behaviour; laws, and so on, as they appear in socially mediated reality, *and as they are defined in language*, precede each individual as much as they *produce* these individuals, along with their dynamic and context-bound sets of values (cf. Marx, 18 Brumaire). Individuals can do no more than shape materials which they find ready to hand in the world, materials of varying levels of abstraction, and they can only do so with the stuff from which they are made (Marx, 1846/1972, p. 118-122). These materials include, are motivated by, and result in, evaluations, or what is technicalised as value.

Being bound up in the strictures of an individualistic psychology (Perry, 1914, 1916), the value philosophers are led to identify the seat of value as being located 'in the individual psycho-physical organism and not in any environmental object' (Perry, 1916, p. 456). But this confuses the point of value manifestation with the source or "seat" of value. It also confuses a "general" with a multitude of particulars. As Marx shows, value can only exist as the product of a social relationship between people and something perceived to be objectively extrinsic to them, even if it this extrinsic "something" is a product of their imagination, a certain perception of themselves, or, indeed, specific people. This is made all the more curious in Perry because he clearly realises that this is the case. Buying into an argument with G.E. Moore (***), Bertrand Russell (***), and George Santayana (***), among others, Perry challenges these philosophers' various theses which claim, in one way or another, that value is merely 'adjectival' and further 'unanalyzable' because it is a 'simple' property, like "yellowness" (1914, p. 143):

One must be prepared to point to a distinct *quale* which appears in that region which our value terms roughly indicate, and which is different from the object's shape, size, from the interrelation of its parts, from its relation to other objects, or to a subject, and from all the other factors belonging to the same context, but designated by words other than good, right, value, etc. I find no such residuum. Moore's comparison of good with the quality "yellow" seems to me to be purely hypothetical. Good would be like yellow *if it were* a simple quality. But then the empirical fact that it is not like yellow argues that it is not a simple quality. There is no difficulty over the meaning of terms connoting simple qualities, nor is there serious difference of opinion likely as to their distribution. (1914, p. 144)

Here again, subjective - objective issues becomes apparent. For Perry and the philosophers at the beginning of the century, "yellow" is an objective, singular quality, a constituent quality which, for people, is instantly and generally recognisable as such. It inheres in certain objective things, and can thus be reduced no further.³ "Simple" for these philosophers means 'a simple relation, not analysable into a community of predicates' (Russell, 1911, p. 111): it is not "factual" in itself, but rather, attains meaning only in a factual relationship with something else, such as "the chair is yellow" (Russell, 1919, p. 285). "Complex", on the other hand, refers to facts: '[t]o say that facts are complex is the same thing as to say that they have *constituents*', including "simples" (p. 286).

³ This is later disproven in the colour studies of the 1980s: Varela, Thompson, Rosch; cf also Lakoff and Johnson 1999. Colour is indeed a relational complex quality (***), which Russell recognises in 1912 (***pp).

Philosophical nuances aside, Perry's sojourn into value leads inexorably towards one conclusion: a division of intellectual labour where value is concerned. After defining the juncture at which moral and economic values meet, he then explains why the economists ought not trouble themselves with moral issues. While Perry allows that 'the economist is welcome to discuss them', he argues that all issues of value not to do with the subjective determination of prices lie outside the sphere of political economy, including alternative models of distribution, production, and exchange, are best dealt with by 'philosophical ethics' (Perry, 1916, p. 485). Thus, 'the most valuable work of the economist will be in the more restricted field', and the "higher" and more "generic" values, those with moral consequences, ought to be left to the philosophical specialist' (p. 485). None of this would be worth mentioning here were it not the case that Perry and the philosophers, at least in the short term, held mainstream intellectual sway in issues of "non-economic" value. Even more pertinent is that the value categories that Perry identifies in his 1916 paper provide some useful points of departure from which to develop categories for analysing value from a linguistic perspective. I enumerate and explain these in the following section.

Subjective value categories in Perry's framework

Perry frames the whole field of "values" in terms of a semantic category, *Interest*, because, he says, we can thus 'avoid the special questions arising from the interrelations of feeling, desire, will, instinct, and disposition' (1916, p. 449). *Interest* is a suitable generic category for Perry because the 'term calls attention to the essential fact that it is characteristic of mind as we know it to be *for* some things and *against* others; or to view some things with favor and other things with disfavor' (p. 449). In other words, for Perry, *Interest* indicates a degree of *Engagement* with an object that carries with it a measure of positive or negative *Desirability*: 'an object, whatsoever it be, acquires value when interest is taken in it; just as anything, whatsoever it be, becomes a target when any one aims at it' (p. 449).

Perry introduces a mediating processual category in the form of *Judgement*. *Pleasure*, he argues is, or can be, 'mediated by a judgement' (p. 451), and judgements abound 'in those felt needs, preferences and decisions which are in economic theory invoked to explain value' (p. 451). Dealing with economic categories naturally leads Perry to include *Utility*, that which a thing 'possesses' when it is 'apt or fit to be so used' (p. 451), and, more tentatively, 'exchangeability', which may be considered as a 'commensurable character, like size or weight' (p. 472). *Availability*, *Possession*, and *Acquisition* also mediate *Interest* (pp. 452-453). These are mediations of *Dependence* or *Importance* (p. 453). One's 'aesthetic interest', for instance, is dependent on one's vision in particular cases (p. 452). In other words, an object of aesthetic interest that depends upon vision can only attain *Importance* for a sighted person. Conversely, a person inclined towards visual aesthetics is *Dependent* upon sight to realise value in this way.

A key observation of Perry's, which nevertheless fails to direct his attention to the social production process, is that '[e]very interest uses or consumes something' (p. 453), namely *time*, which is also exchangeable and commensurable for all things in Perry's system, despite his earlier assertion that labour and value are unrelated (p. 462). Conflicting interests might arise in Perry's economic subject. These are mediated by *Judgement*. The indispensable utility, or *Necessity* or 'felt needs' for particular objects 'will increase or alter their strength by explicating, amplifying, confirming or correcting the judgements on which they rest' (p. 455), and 'the strength of a felt need reflects ... the strength of some interest from which the need arises' (p. 456). Felt needs may be mediated biologically, via the emotions of hunger, such as 'apprehension, solicitude or anxiety' (p. 457). And,

although Perry goes to great lengths to explain what he sees as the tenuous nature of non-individualistic theorising, he admits that felt needs may also be mediated socially, through ‘changes in fashion or mode, in general business confidence, in moral attitude toward this or that sort of consumption, in the distribution of wealth, changes in taxes and other laws, etc.’ (Anderson, 1915, in Perry, 1916, pp. 469-470), and even through the ‘attitude of others’ (Perry, 1916, p. 470). In any case, felt need is the attribution, to greater and lesser degrees, of *Importance* to a thing (p. 458).

Perry’s disdain for any concept which takes into account social influences in political economy, apart from those mentioned above (and these factors impinge for no apparent reason in Perry’s scheme), is summarised in his statement that economic value ‘is there rooted in absolute, subjective values’ (p. 475). He tries to abolish the circularity of marginal value theory by saying that, although the theory ‘is circular, it is not vicious’ (p. 475). That is because the theory starts with individuals and, that these, in summary, equal society (p. 475). Therefore, the theory ‘has a beginning and a direction’ (p. 475). But Perry’s moral schema is not similarly oriented, even though he attempts to make it seem so. His moralising is pure idealism and hardly worth mentioning here. Perry begins with an *a priori*, universal principle: ‘*Moral value attaches to an act, motive or disposition, viewed in the light of a rule or principle, which in turn is designed to organize and harmonize interests*’ (p. 476). Of course, Perry’s “organising principle” appears from nowhere. What Perry is really referring to is social *Normativity*, an inherently social value, but he hides this under a fog of badly-disguised metaphysics:

Now, a principle of organization and adjustment may be of wide or narrow scope. There results a peculiar hierarchy of concentric moral spheres from the private inter-adjustment of an individual’s interests, to the larger totalities of mankind or the Kingdom of God. Each sphere in so far as it is morally organized will possess an internal adjustment of its constituent interests. But in all cases it will hold that in so far as an act is dictated by the principle of harmony and mutuality it is virtuous, and in so far as it ignores or violates such dictates it is vicious. (p. 477)

This line of reasoning, and the insipid binary rhetoric of moral “harmony”, “vicious” and “virtuous” behaviours, and the “concentric spheres” of moral influence, wherever their centres may be, are significant insofar as they are touted today as a *new* way to look at economic development by the “Austrian School” dogmatists in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (1999).

I have chosen to highlight Perry’s work in such a detailed manner for a number of very specific reasons. First, it represents the point at which political economy is relieved of its semantic residue where the concept of value is concerned. Second, it is the point at which an intellectual shift occurred that saw very real and significant social values moved to the semantic and philosophical realm of study. Third, he is very much representative of an individualistic school of thought that prevailed until the tradition of ‘public opinion’ studies became the most powerful force in the study of social value, the possibility of which Perry mentions only in passing, and dismisses as ‘a sum of private opinions’ (1916, p. 464). And, finally, because Perry identifies, albeit in a primitive, socially amputated, circular, and disorganised form, some useful categories for the analysis of values in language. Given the individualistic bias of the intellectual environment at the turn of the twentieth century, which apparently made it impossible to develop a concept of social value, we might view the categories that Perry develops here under the heading of subjective sources of value.

Having outlined the intellectual separation of value studies into subjective economic and semantic disciplines, I will move now, briefly, to outline another major intellectual tradition of values that developed at the same time economics withered into a pseudo-scientific study of price —sociology.

Galtonian sociology and the origin of “normal” people

Normativity is a strictly social, extrinsic category of value. “Normality” is a concept that emerged in a technical form in the study of “eugenics” (Hacking, 1996), and means, literally, “good origins”. At first, eugenics made emerged from the fields of economics, anthropology, biology, and in particular, the science of evolution that emerged with Darwin’s (1865) *The Origin of The Species* (Field, 1911, p. 4). Eugenics quickly became the foundational method of sociology. Social Eugenics was the product of Francis Galton (e.g. 1873, 1887, 1890, 1901, 1904), and was the first post-Enlightenment effort to institutionalise, quantify, and thus make scientific *the value of specific types of people*. The original values of eugenics seem perhaps crude and simplistic by today’s standards:

The main thesis, that great ability is hereditary, is here substantially unaltered; supported, now, by abundant genealogical material, which nearly fills the book with pedigrees of judges, statesmen, the English peerage, commanders, literary men, men of science, poets, musicians, painters, divines, the senior classics of Cambridge, — even oarsmen and wrestlers, as examples of the ability of the muscles rather than of the mind. But if the theme is in the main the same, the manner of presentation is notably changed. Galton’s characteristic originality of thought is reinforced by his equally characteristic attention to scrupulous precision of method. (Field, 1911, p. 6)

And Galton’s methodological influence remains pervasive. He is the inventor of the normative curve, the “standard normal distribution” by which even the intelligence of students is moderated in almost every university throughout the world today. Galton was firstly a student of statistics. We have grown so used to the normative, pervasive, and powerful effects that attach to that term that we easily forget its origins, which are actually written all over its face.

Scientific control of the State was, by the nineteenth century, a three hundred year old dream, an adverse reaction to ‘divine right and royal prerogative’ (Ranney, 1976, p. 143):

This outlook was challenged in the late sixteenth and seventeenth century by what Greenleaf calls the theory of empiricism. This new way of looking at things was first advanced by Francis Bacon and later by James Harrington, Sir William Temple, and Sir William Petty. It was based on the inductive analysis of facts observed from both history and the experience of contemporary governments ...

As one of their principle tools the English empiricists developed “statistics” in the original meaning of the word. The point is worth noting briefly. The empiricists sought to foster what they called “statists” —that is, men who had wide personal experience in and knowledge of political affairs and had, as a result, gained skill in management. (Ranney, 1976, p. 143).

Statistics was thus to be the “statists”’ rigorous collection and comparison of mathematically verifiable facts about society and its control —the tools for a science of social management.

With the theory of evolution, statistics became Eugenics. Galtonian eugenics quickly provided the factual basis for sociology, the intellectual discipline which took up the social residue left behind by price economics and subjective philosophies of value described above. Galton had decided that ‘natural selection’ had failed in the case of the human race, mostly because our laws and sympathies led us to support an ever-growing under-class of poor, and thus inferior, people who would continue to reproduce far much more than the rich, if only by sheer weight of numbers (Galton, 1901, p. 132). To illustrate the perfectly sealed epistemological vacuum in which Galton operated, we might listen to how he speaks about people:

Dr Farr calculated the value at its birth of a baby born of the wife of an Essex labourer, supposing it to be an average specimen of its class in length of life, in cost of maintenance while a child and

in old age, and in earnings during youth and manhood. He capitalised with actuarial skill the prospective values at the time of birth, of the outgoings and the incoming, and on balancing the items found the newly born infant to be worth 5l. A similar process would conceivably bring out the money of value at birth of children destined when they grew up to fall into each of the several classes, and by a different method of appraisal to discover their moral and social worth. As regards the money value of men of the highest class, many found great industries, establish vast undertakings, increase the wealth of multitudes and amass large fortunes for themselves. Others, whether rich or poor, are the guides and light of the nation, raising its tone, enlightening the difficulties and imposing its ideals. The most gifted of these men, members of our yet undefined X class, would each be worth thousands of pounds to the nation at the moment of their birth. (1901, p. 132)

Here we see the background of vicious logic against which Aldous Huxley's wrote his *Brave New World* (1932/1994). Again, from a serious intellectual position, Galton ought hardly be worth mentioning. And, were it not for the enormity and duration of the movement which Galton's eugenics inspired and shaped, he *could* be ignored here. As it happened, though, he shaped the dominant ideologies for the "left" and "right" of political and sociological thought, overtly through to 1940, when Hitler and the Third Reich, possessed of Galtonian notions of 'race hygiene', mechanically and systematically annihilated the least "valuable", most "abnormal" and "burdensome" people in their society.

Eugenics is often thought of today as a curious relic of naïve nineteenth century thought, a somewhat marginal ideology associated with Social Darwinism which was only ever taken seriously in Hitler's Germany. But that is far from being the case. Eugenics was accepted across the political spectrum throughout Europe, Russia, and the United States. It was enthusiastically embraced by political entities of all kinds: conservatives, liberals, Fabianists, Marxists, and Communists all embraced various "brands" of eugenics, suitably tailored their political ideologies (Graham, 1977; Paul, 1984, pp. 567-571). For the elitist conservative tradition, Galton's eugenics provided objective "proof" that the poor were inherently inferior, precisely for the reason that they were poor, thus justifying structural poverty. For the liberal socialists, most notably the Fabianists, who believed that 'the causes of science and socialism were inextricably linked', eugenics provided a scientific sociological method by which 'social stocks' would be improved (Paul, 1984, p. 574), much in the manner of the recent notions of "human capital".

Some of the best-known and most admired writers, politicians, business people, and scientists, in the US and Britain, formed the core of the eugenics movement for the first four decades of the twentieth century. These include H.G. Wells, Sydney and Beatrice Webb, Julian Huxley, George Bernard Shaw, Harold Laski, Eden and Cedar Paul, and innumerable others (Paul, 1984, pp. 567-568). Some endorsed positive eugenics, encouraging the wealthy and influential to 'breed' more prolifically thus increasing the quality of human genetic stocks; while others, such as Haldane and Wells, advocated for negative eugenics, 'the sterilization of defectives'; the deinstitutionalisation of families, social welfare, and health care; and the separation of reproductive processes from the irrational emotions of romance and love (Graham, 1977; Haldane, 1938, in Paul, 1984, p. 571; Shaw, 1911). The most significant contribution of the eugenics movement, at least so far as this paper is concerned, was to inculcate the conception of objective, "value-free" *Normativity*: the mythical "normal person" became a social, empirically verifiable fact (Hacking, 1996, pp. 59-61), thus paving the way for assumptions about the inherent inequality of whole classes, races, and "types" of people (Carlson, 1937; Hacking, 1996; Graham, 1977; Paul, 1984).

The period that saw eugenics as the dominant mode of thought in politics and sociology also saw ‘the gradual crystallization of political value links to specific biological interpretations’ (Graham, 1977). What happened as a result of such values being propagated *en masse* was the inhumane mass murders in Stalin’s USSR and Hitler’s Germany. The threat of ‘breeding down’ within nations, an increase in the proportion of ‘*subnormal individuals*’ (Carlson, 1937, in Swann Harding, 1937, p. 681), became a weapon for totalitarian social control and unbridled barbarism. Further, at the height of the eugenics movement, between 1934 and 1938, the predominance of actuarial statistics, combined with the economic emphasis on cost and price, pushed jurisprudence to place a precise figure on ‘the value of life’: Galton’s worldview had become quantified in law (Symmons, 1938).

This was the first form of *social value* that had been realised in any large-scale intellectual and political movement since the early nineteenth century socialists. It relied on a false, pseudo-scientific, ostensibly “value-free” objectivity that either ignored or artificially elided the effects of history and society, even when they were acknowledged as a factor in the success of individuals (Galton, 1901). Whole classes of people were marked with a price, and attributed with a whole set of social and moral predilections. This was a worldview that flourished at a time when the first electronic mass medium, the radio, became available. Public opinion and social values suddenly became the most valuable of all commodities (Graham, 2000). Consequently, these were to be measured and manipulated accordingly.

Propaganda and public opinion: “the dictatorship of palaver”

Propaganda is as old as public opinion and ideology (as it is understood today), but its most sophisticated study had to wait for the radio to come into widespread use. While other figures, like George Gallup (1938) and Edward Bernays (1928), were co-pioneers in public opinion studies, Harold Lasswell (1927, 1941) remains, I think, the most sophisticated of the early propagandists. So I will begin with him. It is here, in the early studies of propaganda techniques, that a systematic study of the relationship between new media, language, and value emerges for the first time. Also, we see the concept of evaluative patterns gaining currency. For Lasswell,

Propaganda is the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols. The word attitude is taken to mean a tendency to act according to certain *patterns of evaluation*. The existence of an attitude is not a direct datum of experience, but an inference from science which have a conventionalised *significance*. ... The valuational patterns upon which this inference is founded may be primitive gestures of the face and body, or more sophisticated gestures of the pen and voice. Taken together, these objects which have a standard meaning in a group are called *significant symbols*. The elevated eyebrow, the clenched fist, the sharp voice, the pungent phrase, have their references established within the web of a particular culture. Such significant symbols are paraphernalia employed in expressing attitudes, and they are also capable of being employed to reaffirm or redefine attitudes. (Lasswell, 1927, p. 627, emphases added)

Lasswell has a clear grasp of the subtle tensions between the social and the individual, between objective and subjective aspects of value, and, drawing on social anthropological findings and theory (see below), avoids all the vulgarities of extreme individualism and Hobbesian functionalism. The ‘collective attitude’ is not on a ‘plane apart from individual actions’ (p. 628). Rather, Lasswell sees ‘the collective attitude’ as a ‘pattern’ which designates ‘standard uniformities of conduct at a given time and place’ (p. 628). The ‘collective attitude’ is a ‘distribution of individual acts and not an indwelling spirit which has achieved transitory realization in the rough, coarse facts of the world of sense’ (p. 628). Lasswell differentiates between the techniques of attitude change by psychiatric means and by means of propaganda. The former is based on having ‘access to the individual’s

private stock of meanings', whereas the latter is based on 'the standard meanings of the *groups* of which the individual is a member' (p. 628). This is no crude structuralist understanding of group behaviour. Lasswell sees that the individual moves through, what are now known as, multiple discourse communities, and that each of these groups has its own peculiar *attitudinal patterns* of meaning (cf. Lemke, 1995). Nor is Lasswell seduced by the idea that any of the elements of propaganda are static entities: '[n]o propaganda fits tightly into its category of major emphasis, and it must be remembered that pigeon-holes are invented to serve convenience and not to satisfy yearnings for the immortal and the immutable' (p. 629). Propaganda may be positive or negative, but its *object* is always cultural values:

Every cultural group has its vested values ... An object toward which it is hoped to arouse hostility must be presented as a menace to as many of these values as possible. There are always ambitious hopes of increasing values, and the object must be made to appear as a stumbling block to their realization. There are patterns of right and wrong, and the object must be made to flout the good. There are standards of propriety, and the object must appear ridiculous and gauche. If the plan is to draw out positive attitudes toward an object, it must be presented, not as a menace and an obstruction, nor as despicable or absurd, but as a protector of our values, a champion of our dreams, and a model of virtue and propriety. (p. 630)

The means by which desirable or undesirable attitudes are organised towards the objects of propaganda are not "things", nor are they oriented towards 'the acceptance of an idea without reflection', nor are they even concrete "suggestions"; they are, rather, the manipulation of 'cultural material with a recognizable meaning' (p. 631). Moreover, they are a 'form of words' (p. 631), whether 'spoken, written, pictorial, or musical, and the number of stimulus carriers is infinite' (p. 631). Propaganda has become necessary, according to Lasswell, because of 'technological changes', especially the rise of literacy and the channels of communication, and because most of what could 'formerly be done by violence and coercion must now be done by argument and persuasion' (p. 631). For Lasswell, the sum total of advanced technology, increased literacy, and the widespread 'ventilation of opinions and the taking of votes' is that '[d]emocracy has proclaimed the dictatorship of palaver, and the technique of dictating to the dictator is named propaganda' (p. 631).

Normative notions of power over attitudes and values pervade the propagandists' writing. For Bernays (1928), nephew of Sigmund Freud and considered by the modern Public Relations industry as its founder, public opinion, '[l]ooked at from the broadest standpoint, is the power of the group to sway the larger public in its attitude' (p. 958). Its technique is 'the psychology of public persuasion' (p. 959). But, he notes, the techniques of 'sociology' are just as important to propaganda (p. 961). The process of 'manipulating public opinion' begins with 'statistics' and 'field-surveying' (p. 961). Knowledge of 'group cleavages of society, the importance of group leaders, and the habits of their followers' are essential knowledge for the successful propagandist (p. 961). Armed with this, the propagandist must learn how, within given groups, to make 'an old principle apply to a new idea'; to substitute 'ideas by changing *clichés*'; to overcome prejudices, to make 'a part stand for the whole'; and to create 'events and circumstances that stand for his ideas' (p. 961). Bernays considers that 'a circumstance or circumstances of dramatic moment' are the events that change and establish the 'functioning of given attitudes toward given subjects, such as religion, sex, race, morality, nationalism, internationalism, and so forth' (p. 961). Whether the object is attitudes towards hats or attitudes towards sexuality, Bernays believed that, in the 'age of mass production', there must be a corresponding 'technique for the mass distribution of ideas', and thus for the mass production of public opinion (p. 971). It becomes apparent that we can speak of value relations, which implies the

production of these relations, something to hold them in “sensible” place, or to shake them loose from that place.

By 1941, Lasswell had, through a longitudinal study of mass media throughout the world, developed a system of categorising the values attributed to particular symbols which, he argues, ‘supply us with data about many of the missing links in the process of political and social development’ (Lasswell, 1941, p. 459). The term ‘symbols’, here, means construals of idealised entities like ‘Germany’ or ‘The Prime Minister’ or ‘Labour’ (pp. 460-461). It is worth enumerating a ‘representative—certainly not an exhaustive—list of standards’, or evaluative categories, developed by Lasswell (p. 460).

Some broad categories in Lasswell’s analytical approach

The broadest of Lasswell’s categories are *Indulgence*, a positive presentation of valued symbols when they are put ‘in a favorable light’; and *Deprivation*, a negative presentation of a valued symbol by its place ‘in an unfavorable setting’. *Indulgences* may be ‘positive-realized’ (‘a gain is realized for the symbol’); ‘negative-realized’ (‘a loss may be avoided for the symbol’), ‘positive-promised’ (‘gains promised for the future’), or negative-promised (‘future losses will be avoided’). *Deprivations* may be ‘positive-realized’ (‘actual losses sustained’), ‘negative-realized’ (‘gains are blocked in the past’), ‘positive-threatened’ (losses ‘may be referred to the future’), or negative-threatened (‘blocked gains may be referred to the future’) (p. 460).

The following broad categories of evaluators may also appear in positive or negative polarities:

1. *Expediency (Strength)*: ‘describes the position of the object of reference in regard to such values as safety, goods, respect (power and respect are sub-categories of deference)’;
 - 1a. *Safety*: the security ‘of persons, groups or things’;
 - 1ab. *Efficiency*: the ‘level of performance of a function’;
 - 1b. *Power*: ‘control over important decisions ... measured according to the means of decision-making—fighting, diplomacy, voting...’;
 - 1bb. *Efficiency of Power*
 - 1c. *Goods*: ‘the volume and distribution of goods and services’;
 - 1cb. *Efficiency of Goods*
 - 1d. *Respect*: the degree of esteem attributed to a symbol
 - 1db. *Efficiency of Respect*
2. *Morality (obligation to adhere to moral standards)*
 - 2a. *Truth-Falsehood*: ‘the obligation to refrain from the deliberate dissemination of falsehood’;
 - 2b. *Mercy-Atrocity*: ‘makes use of a moral standard to justify acts, the obligation to refrain from inflicting unnecessary cruelty’;
 - 2c. *Heroism-Cowardice*: ‘the obligation to act courageously’;
 - 2d. *Loyalty-Disloyalty*: ‘the obligation to serve a common purpose’;
3. *Propriety*: ‘the obligation to learn a conventional code’

4. *Divinity*: ‘an obligation to abide by the Will of God’;
5. *Legality*: ‘the standard is to abide by law’
6. *Beauty*: the ‘standard is aesthetic’
7. *Consistency*: the ‘standards are logical relationships among proposition [*sic*]’;
8. *Probability*: ‘[p]robability of a statement with no imputation of falsification’;
9. *Euphoria-Dysphoria*: the ‘standard is agreeable or disagreeable subjective states’;
10. *Omnibus*: ‘Statements fusing many standards’ (pp. 460-462)

Many of the categories that Lasswell identifies here are found in the more recent sociolinguistics of Martin (1998, 2000), Halliday (1994), and Lemke (1998).

“So much the worse for the facts”: Truth, semantics, and propaganda

The milieu within which Lasswell (1941) developed the categories of the *World Attention Survey* — a title that reflects Lasswell’s assertion that an object of propaganda must be first be shown to be *significant* to be considered worthy of attracting an evaluation — can be seen in the very existence and influence of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis (in Hayakawa, 1939). Faced for the first time with a deluge of instantaneous messages in print and, more particularly, radio, the institute urged the public not to be ‘[s]wayed by emotion’, to ‘examine the facts’, to recognise that “‘reason” and “thoughtfulness” are always on the side of the “facts”” (Hayakawa, 1939, p. 197). This is good advice, according to the anti-propaganda institute, because ‘[t]he facts speak for themselves!’ (p. 199). Of course, as Hayakawa points out, ‘the facts never do anything of the kind’ (p. 199). There is vast qualitative difference between the subjective facts of experience that *do* speak for themselves, such as when ‘your hand is caught in a door-jamb’, and the social manifestations of such a fact: ‘To others it may be a source of distress, pity, amusement, or genuine gratification depending on whether they like you or not’ (p. 200). There is not point, for Hayakawa, in the ‘semantic discipline’ of ‘finding the referent’ because language stands not only for referents, ‘but also for the entire doctrinal structure’, including ‘moral evaluations’ in which language is realised, enacted, embedded, and appraised (pp. 200-201).

We cannot, according to Hayakawa, follow the first law of Aristotlean logic - self-identity of the object - with any certainty because such an object, where human cognition is concerned, is inevitably a relationship between ‘an event and the observer’ (pp. 202-203).⁴ This relationship is mediated by socially conditioned doctrines, and is influenced by the tendency of language, noted later by Halliday (1993) amongst others, towards ‘objectification’ or ‘hypostatization’ (Hayakawa, pp. 202-204). Therefore, the high level of abstractions that obtains in such terms as “‘the Renaissance,” “popular unrest,” “the effects of war,” “Cultural lag,” “economic crisis,” “the impact of new social forces,” *etc.* are *conveniences* which may (or may not) impose a significant order on the chaos of events’ (p. 204). Subject to ‘the primitive habits of objectification’, such conveniences can become, through ‘complete conditioning’, perceived and construed as very real “things”, with the attendant values that cleave to their social context of production, whether it be a university, parliament, or church (pp.

⁴ Of course this implies that self-identity lies in the interaction, i.e., that any given relational process of observing has identity with itself. This perspective resonates with the autopoietic perspective of Maturana and Varela (1981, 1987, cf. also Graham and McKenna, 2000).

205-206). This degree of unconscious objectification is what Hayakawa calls ‘pathological objectification’ (p. 206). Its appeal is socially functional to some extent:

Scientific formulation is that which enables the comparative nit-wit to perform quickly and easily tasks which formerly could be performed only by the wisest men [*sic*]: a high-school student now, for example, can do certain mathematical calculations which at one time were possible for only two or three of the greatest mathematicians in Europe. (p. 206)

Similarly, the formulaically conditioned emotional reactions to our world - “‘Jews—enemies,” “strike—violence,” aspirin—Bayer’s,” “Russia—Red” - tend to become systematised and objectified in a similar way, and these are ‘the most marked features of public stupidity’ (p. 208).

In the propagandists’ work we see, again, an emphasis on the relationship and tension between social influences and individual psychology, and between objective and subjective, exogenous and endogenous, sources and measures of value. We especially see an increasing emphasis on the role of *language* in value determination. For the propagandists it seems that the objective social milieu is an extrinsic shaper of the subjective values of individual psychologies, even, and perhaps especially, if these values are directed towards the objectified abstractions that typify public discourse in mass society. We also see a strong emphasis on the relationship between perceptions of value, language, and media. Already, there is concern about the amounts of money being spent on US election campaigns (Poole, 1939, p. 371). But this is merely a quantitative aspect of a qualitative change in the way value determinations are being reached in the public sphere.

For Poole, elections and opinion polls are ways of arriving at ‘value judgements’ (p. 371). Poole claims that, at the most fundamental level, ‘there is a choice between divine and human judgement’ (p. 372), and that having given God short shrift we must now rely solely on human judgement. Poole reduces the ‘determination of values’ by humans to two ‘principles’ of judgement, one based in ‘the qualitative or heroic’, the other, ‘quantitative and statistical’ (p. 372). Judgements

by either the qualitative or quantitative principle may take place in two dimensions. These dimensions may be called conveniently time and space. The dimension of time is historical and its use opens up the store of human judgements found in the records of history and the enduring monuments of literature and art. The other dimension is simply that which we are more accustomed to think of in this ordinary connection, running at right angles to time (p. 374).

Poole, like Gallup (1938), sees the possibility of what we now call “direct democracy” destroying representative government because of a tendency towards ‘laziness or moral cowardice’ on the part of ‘legislators and executive leaders’ (Poole, 1939, p. 374):

They are honestly disposed to believe that the “voice of the people” (that is a majority) is the voice of God or Truth; or, to state the matter less theologically, that in a human world the best value judgement is the judgement of the greatest number of humans on any given problem at any given time. This is the quantitative or statistical, as opposed to the solely qualitative, idea. We have come to be so committed to it in our political philosophy that the cost and fuss and noise of the elections and polls are taken for granted—even welcomed, as adornments of our political life, which perhaps they are. (p. 374).

The historical search for ‘judgements in the dimension of time’ is firstly based on ‘the qualitative or heroic principle’, a kind of “‘Gallup poll” taken in the dimension of time’. (p. 375). Thus, with the introduction of Gallup’s (1938) techniques, ‘value judgements in the domain of public affairs are come to, apparently, by an interesting, and rather reassuring, interaction and cross-control between the qualitative and quantitative principles operating in the two dimensions of time and space’ (Poole, 1939, p. 375). Here we see the foregrounding of a formalised concept of *static and dynamic*

categories of value *in terms of human action*: Poole appeals to an apparently static past set of value judgements on the basis of the 'heroic' quality of past judgements, and the 'statistical' judgements of the great mass of people as measured by techniques such as those of Gallup (1938) and Bernays (1928).

Gallup (1938) held no such conceptions of historical balance in matters of judgement, preferring to think of democracy as a reactive relationship between political action and ongoing measurements of public opinion:

James Bryce said that the next and final stage in our democracy would be reached if the will of the majority of citizens were to be ascertainable at all times.

With the development of the science of measuring public opinion, it can be stated with but few qualifications, that this stage in our democracy is rapidly being reached. It is now possible to ascertain, with a high degree of accuracy, the views of the people on all national issues. (Gallup, 1938, p. 9)

Clearly, the implications of manipulative activities in the public arena do not escape Gallup. The usefulness of polling is not to be confined to government or politics. It can be 'equally useful in the field of social problems' (p. 13). Once sufficient is known about specific attitudes - opinions about welfare, religious prejudice, venereal disease, and any problem of attitude whatsoever - they can be addressed 'with equal success' (pp. 13-14). Thus, 'with many of our leading psychologists and social scientists' interested in the problem of measuring public opinion, 'it will not be long before the final stage in the development of our democracy, as described by Bryce, has been reached—that the will of the majority of citizens can be ascertained at all times' (p. 14). Questions about the relationship between the "facts" of public opinion, centralised control of media, and the quality of government and its organs appear to elude Gallup in his enthusiasm for an early end to the History of democracy. These questions, muted and smudged over by Gallup's methodological enthusiasms, were answered with a resounding blast from Western Europe, the shockwaves of which are still being felt today.

Propaganda and value in Nazi Germany

No mention of propaganda, language, and values can exclude Nazi Germany. While Goebbels was clearly influenced by Bernays, at least to some extent, it may also be said that American and British propaganda studies were influenced by the practices of the Nazis, quite naturally given their "success" (see e.g. Adorno, ***; Lasswell, 1927; Lazarsfeld, ***; Chicago School stuff from 30s; etc). For the Nazis, like Bernays and Lasswell, propaganda is qualitatively different from advertising, and it is a matter of moral obligation to the public, a value and public good in itself:

Political propaganda may not be confused with advertising. Advertising changes its target as needed. The Americans call it "ballyhoo." The word means making a lot of noise about something, whether it is worth it or not. The art of advertising works this way. Advertising agencies push one thing today, another tomorrow, each time making it sound as if nothing else in the world is worth mentioning. There is no thought of moral or national values. "Ballyhoo" is advertising at any price, with no moral content, no moral thought or responsibility. The Americans made "ballyhoo" against Germany during the World War until the American public finally believed that the Germans were cannibals whose elimination would be a godly deed. "Ballyhoo" is unlimited, arbitrary exaggeration. In a political sense, it is incitement, distortion, and it is all immoral.

When we talk about the necessity of political propaganda, we seek powerful moral goals. We want to make our people a united nation that confidently and clearly understands National Socialism's policies, quickly and correctly. We cannot change our political principles as we would a consumer

good, becoming random, irresponsible and immoral. We do not want to distort, confuse or incite, rather clarify, unify, and tell the truth. Political propaganda is the highest responsibility, it is a moral duty, a national duty. We may never think there is too much of it, or that it is superfluous. (Wells, 1936)

Moral and national values are conflated in the Nazi doctrine. This is characteristic: ‘For us, gold is not a measure of the value of money. Our foundation is German labor and confidence in the Führer’ (Lange, in NSDAP, 1939). Attitude and value are also synonymous for the Nazi propagandists. These are testable aspects of human experience which are open to manipulation:

The National Socialist worldview is an attitude, an attitude that must show a courageous face to the outside, but domestically be infused with camaraderie. If the people are to continue to believe in the National Socialist movement, the movement must maintain and guard this camaraderie and pass it on to the future. The struggle behind us is unique. Future generations will be spared such a struggle. It must be replaced by a firm attitude, which can only be tested in every day life. Our task is to reawaken the old values of courage and pride in our people, and to do all that we see as necessary.

... world history today must be rewritten, and that we will do the rewriting. It would be a mistake to delegate the task to the teachers and professors who wrote previous histories, for they grew up under the old world and were educated in it. The 2000 year old Christian age is dying and a new national Socialist world under Adolf Hitler is being born. The youth are growing up in this new world. Our task is to serve these ideas and to lead the struggle. Then we will be able to look confidently into the future. (Rosenberg, 1939, in NSDAP, 1939).

The futuristic orientation of the Nazi regime is well documented. The “thousand-year Reich” was a familiar object of Nazis propaganda (Bullock, 1991). Ideas and leaders were to be served to this end. The paranoid values of ‘negative eugenics’ (e.g. Herbert, 1913; Wells, in Galton, 1911), social Darwinism, and the natural state of all-pervasive competition were propagated through film (Hippler, 1937); through radio (Goebbels, 1933); through printed materials, and by every means and medium available to the propagandists, including cultural gatherings, mass marches, and even ‘stickers’; and *especially* through the spoken and written word (Stark, 1930). Children were not to be excluded from the vicious logic that inheres in seeing our world as a manifestation of the competition of every living thing against every other living thing. A fifth-grade text-book ‘for young girls’ from the Nazi era is instructive here:

We have established that all creatures, plants as well as animals, are in a continual battle for survival. Plants crowd into the area they need to grow. Every plant that fails to secure enough room and light must necessarily die. Every animal that does not secure sufficient territory and guard it against other predators, or lacks the necessary strength and speed or caution and cleverness will fall prey to its enemies. The army of plant eaters threatens the plant kingdom. Plant eaters are prey for carnivores. The battle for existence is hard and unforgiving, but is the only way to maintain life. This struggle eliminates everything that is unfit for life, and selects everything that is able to survive. (Harm and Wiehle, 1942, p. 168)

That is familiar rhetoric. A set of values and imperatives for action flow from such an understanding of life, familiar once again today. Appeals to fear; to immutable laws of nature; to subjective psychology; to doctrines of scarce resources; to eugenic sociology; to work; to the future of the nation; to racial “hygiene”; to science, technology, and truth — this combination of appeals formed the basis of Nazi propaganda. The comprehensive and oppressive range of the Nazis’ appeals, combined with a centralised control of media, made its effects profound, widespread, and vicious. The objective was quite simple: to change the nation’s “patterns of evaluation”:

Its task is to free those who today still are rooted and anchored in the foreign ideas of liberalism and Marxism, to make them feel, think and act according to National Socialism, to bring them to the point where they judge and evaluate everything according to National Socialist principles. (Dietz, 1934)

The nation's patterns of evaluation *were* successfully manipulated by the Party, and the rest, as the saying goes, is history.

Social anthropology, sociolinguistics, and value

An important contribution to the technical study of value can be found in social anthropology. Early work by Durkheim (1915), Mauss (1925/1990), and Malinowski (1921) on symbolic value forms the basis of this thread of thought (Firth, 1953). As concrete as social anthropology's object might pretend to be, the study of values in this field has never been treated as unproblematic. Various postmodern perspectives, following the work of Kuhn (1962), make claims about new insights into the relativity of scientific values. But since at least 1908, it has been recognised that, both in the 'physical and natural sciences', and perhaps moreso in the social sciences, there exists a slippery relationship between 'fact and value, or, more generally, science and value' (Urban, 1908, p. 291). But social science has always been somewhat more suspect to charges of value judgements because 'these sciences, or this part of science, unlike the physical sciences, contains value judgements or propositions as part of the very material of science itself' (p. 292). Of course, it has long been recognised that 'truth' is a certain form of value in itself (Aristotle, 1999); that 'every attempt to describe truth value and to discriminate it from other values, must be a description of its nature'; and that 'truth and error are values belonging to the experience of judging' (Moore, 1908, p. 430).

These concerns about the relationship between the value judgements made by social researchers and what they "see" in cultures which are often foreign to theirs is very much a foundational aspect of social anthropological theory; "value" is a fundamental aspect of the experience and formulation of social anthropology as a discipline, both theoretically and practically (Firth, 1953). In social anthropology, language, value, and action are inextricably joined: 'Social anthropologists are, in general, concerned with social relations expressed in behaviour – verbal behaviour as well as non-verbal behaviour; words as well as acts' (Firth, 1953, p. 146). For Firth, value is the determining element in human social relations, value is what gives social action meaning. Value is expressed in patterns of social 'preference' or 'decision-taking' (p. 146); as a concept, value 'gives reality to our structural concepts' (p. 147): 'The preferences in social relations, their worthwhileness, the standards of judgement applied, give a context and meaning to social action. This is the field for the study of values' (p. 146).

Firth's conception of value, and of social anthropology *tout court*, is social, subjective, endogenous, and dynamic. Value helps to clarify 'the theory of stability and change in in social action' (p. 147). As such, value is a foundational concept for social anthropology because the most important concern for anthropology is 'getting an adequate theoretical basis for dynamic analysis' (p. 147). It is worth noting that more recent sensitivities to the conceptual tensions between social structure, function, form, agency, and process are not something unique to the current (circa 1980-2000) period. Firth emphasises that social anthropologists 'must guard against reifying values, much as we should avoid reifying social structures' (p. 147). Therefore, 'the anthropologist's notions of values may change in accordance with a changing climate of opinion', and the anthropological 'definition of values in its widest meaning is an operational one' (p. 147). For these reasons, according to Firth, the anthropologist's conception and 'treatment of value tends to be broader in cultural scope, more

realistic in illustration, and still fitted to a general social theory’ compared with other disciplines in the social sciences (p. 147).

The most broad semantic categories foregrounded by what Firth has to say about values are those of normativity and desirability. For Firth, values are expressed in *evaluative patterns*, or patterns of evaluation (p. 148). Anthropological research sometimes makes the mistake of pushing values into ‘the realm of the irrational and the unconscious’, thus giving ‘no basis for any change in value judgements’ (p. 148). One way to avoid dismissing values in this way is to look at value in terms of ‘patterns’ which ‘prescribe and delineate the *acceptable*’ (p. 148). From this viewpoint, desirability and normativity are inseparable aspects of value:

A pattern is not merely a systematic regular chain or modal form of behaviour. It also carries an invitation or command to reproduce the pattern as well as an exclusion and proscription of what is outside it and therefore unacceptable. By implication here is a most important aspect of value, namely its quality of being something wanted and felt to be proper to be wanted. (Firth, 1953, p. 148)

That is about it for the moment on the historical side of things. I have obviously left out a lot here, but the literature I have referred to is substantial, both in its scope and in the richness of its own bibliographical material. But the point to emphasise before I go on to some methodological concerns is that the notion of *evaluative patterns* is, I think, perhaps the most important and useful conception for the further study of value linguistics. It is also an expedient expression based on my own reading of Lemke’s work which stresses thematic patterns as the basic unit of analysis. As you may see below, these are complementary analytical concepts which ought to repel a stifling methodology and promote the flexibility I see as necessary for linguistic analysis.

II

Predication and propagation: reconciling two analytical methods and their different limitations

After applying Lemke’s (1998) model to a corpus drawn from an Australian union dispute (Graham 1998), I found that, across long stretches of texts, the seven dimensions of evaluation listed in the model interacted in both predictable and unpredictable ways. The predictable aspect was that overall evaluations of *Desirability* and/or *Importance* tended to propagate where the points of contention in the dispute were foregrounded in written and spoken language about the dispute by the participants (I drew all spoken texts from interviews with random union members at a picket line on May Day, 1998). These points of conflict manifested themselves in no more than five ‘thematic patterns’ (Lemke 1995) around which the dispute was discursively organised (this despite the fact that I had collected hundreds of pages of background texts and hours of interview data over almost a year!).

The unpredictable aspect was that the dimensions of *Desirability* and/or *Importance* propagated across the top of, or were scaffolded by, or emerged from evaluative interplay between positive and negative dimensions of *all* the propositional evaluative dimensions, including *Desirability* and *Importance* themselves, seemingly in any ‘order’ whatsoever. The ‘patterns of evaluation’ (Firth, 1948) evident in the scaffolding, though, eventually seemed to take on a vague regularity by the end of the analysis. But I had no way of sorting through this. I found myself faced with a dilemma that implied an hierarchical arrangement of evaluative dimensions.

Here is a fragment from the MUA corpus that highlights what I mean:

ITF 1⁵ in the MUA organisational literature

The PLOT thickens [D, H]⁶. SANDLINE [D, U, N] industrial mercenaries, SAS COMMANDOS [D, U, N] Canberra CONSPIRACIES [D, U], Victorian government PRISON [D] shields and body guards, a phalanx of LAWYERS [D], SHELF [D, U] companies and COWBOY [D, H] operators, farmers in SUITS [U, H], a MYSTERIOUS JUNK BOND KING [D, U, C] with a penchant for MAO MEMORABILIA [D, U] and one DESPERATE [D] man – one MERCHANT BANKER [D, U] now stevedoring boss – Chris Corrigan (MUA, 1998a, p. 4).

The evaluative chain, overall, propagates *un-Desirability* on the part of the ‘conspirators’. It does so mainly across the dimensions of *un-Usuality* and, to a lesser degree, *in-Appropriateness*. But these evaluative meanings are carried along all other evaluative dimensions identified by Lemke, even that of *Humourousness*. Humour is realised through highly intertextual resources: ‘The plot thickens’ sets the tone for a peculiarly Australian co-textual and intertextual mixture of sardonic, satirical, and disrespectful evaluations of the conspirators. The evaluations for *un-Desirability* and *un-Usuality* also draw heavily on intertextual resources. For instance, the *un-Desirable*, *un-Usual*, *in-Appropriate* element, SANDLINE, intertextually refers to a company that came to international public prominence prior to the ‘Dubai Affair’⁷. The Papua-New Guinean Government had illegally hired mercenaries from the Sandline company in an attempt to defeat Bougainville rebels. The ‘Sandline Affair’ caused regional, if not international, outrage and the company was eventually expelled from New-Guinea under internal and international political pressure.

Here, the intertextual and heteroglossic evaluative salience of SANDLINE highlights the ‘pervasive tendency for metaphorical transfer *among* the evaluative semantic dimensions’ (Lemke, 1998). As a metaphorical evaluator, SANDLINE acts as an intertextual, evaluative ‘gateway’ which is on the border ‘between lexical and grammatical metaphor’ (1998). It allows *un-Desirability* and *un-Usuality* to propagate along the dimensions of

- **Warrantability:** There *is* a PLOT because this *un-Usual* group of people are associated with one another against the MUA;
- **Normativity:** This is an *in-Appropriate* association of groups in the context of an industrial dispute;

⁵ The five ITF’s foregrounded in the dispute by the MUA (Maritime Union of Australia) are: 1) The MUA and its members are the innocent and unwitting victims of an evil conspiracy by capitalist forces to undermine the rights of all Australians; 2) MUA members are heroes who are fighting for Australian workers. Its leaders are subversive metaphors of populist, folk-hero culture: For instance, ‘John Coombes is the Ned Kelly of the 1990s’; 3) The MUA is an efficient, world-class workforce that typically works under the third-world, extremely dangerous conditions created by a regime of unjust legislators and unscrupulous and impersonal capitalists; 4) The MUA is powerful because it stands united; 5) The waterfront is not a closed shop or a monopoly. People *choose* to join the union because it is traditionally a strong, democratic, fair union that looks after its members’ interests. They were constituted in various intertextual relationships with its opposition’s discourses.

⁶ [D] Desirability/Inclination; [W] Warrantability/Probability; [N] Normativity/Appropriateness; [U] Usuality/Expectability; [I] Importance/Significance; [C] Comprehensibility/Obviousness; [H] Humourousness/Seriousness.

⁷ during which the Australian government and Patrick Stevedores jointly funded a training program for current and ex-soldiers, including SAS commandos, as stevedores. Subsequently, this newly-trained group of stevedoring soldiers attacked wharves around the country at midnight, forcibly ejecting MUA workers, locking them out on behalf of their employers.

- **Comprehensibility:** Appears in both negative and positive Degrees: a *mysterious* JUNK BOND KING; *Obviously* there is a plot [which is also in-Comprehensible!] against the MUA;
- **Humour,** which propagates at a high level of abstraction intertextually and culturally; and,
- **Importance:** It is *Significant* that the CEO of Patrick, Chris Corrigan, is involved in the dispute).

All these dimensions interact by their metaphorical, co-textual, and intertextual relationships to evaluatively propagate *un-Desirability* across the main evaluative “scaffolding” of *un-Usuality* and *in-Appropriateness*.

So: what is a relatively simple model where a single proposition is concerned becomes a tangled and complex web of hierarchical value relations, much (if not all, at times) of which must be inferred intertextually, when we want to apply it to much longer stretches of text.

Affect, Judgement, Appreciation, and Engagement: Martin’s model of ‘appraisal’

I became familiar with Martin’s (2000) model some time after applying Lemke’s. Although I cannot claim intimate knowledge of the system, after tentatively applying it to the policy corpus on which I am currently working, I have already run into some limitations (which I have since discussed at length with JRM who has provided me with excellent advice). First, the notion that all appraisals or evaluationa values are ‘encoded emotion’ is problematic for me. The idea that rationality and emotionality are separate or separable aspects of human experience is a uniquely “western” conception (Firth, 1953). Then there are intractable grammatical difficulties to deal with. Take, for instance, the problem of *nominalised* affect, realised here as projected ‘concern’ (an expression of disquiet):

But, there is **concern** that the *traditional strengths of adaptability and resilience* of the Hong Kong people have gradually been eroded by the “bubble economy” created in the early 1990s. Some in the community **believe** that it has generated a “get rich quick” mindset that could seriously undermine the strong work ethic that has long been associated with the Hong Kong workforce. There is also **concern** that, in some quarters, a dependency culture has developed and with it, increasing and sometimes unrealistic **expectations** as to both the role of the Government and its ability to provide additional services. (hongkvis, w: 9,378, beliexx.cnc)

In this text, from the perspective of appraisal theory, *concern* is nominalised affect, a reference to feelings of ‘insecurity’, or ‘disquiet’ (Martin, 2000). But nobody in particular is *feeling* the *concern* –it is projected from nowhere and nobody as an existential “Thing”. As such, it gets to function in a number of ways. First it provides an ‘evaluative cohesion’ (Lemke, 1998) device that relates fairly incommensurable elements: *the traditional strengths of adaptability and resilience of the Hong Kong people; the “bubble economy”; a “get rich quick” mindset; the Hong Kong workforce; a dependency culture; increasing and sometimes unrealistic expectations; and the role of the Government*. All of these are bundled together – semantically conflated and dominated – under an umbrella of disembodied *concern* that propagates, albeit intertextually, the *un-Desirability* of “welfare dependency”, as well as the *Importance* of diligence to a particular work ethic (cf. Fairclough, 2000; Weber, 1932/ 1992).

A second effect of nominalising appraisal resources is that they can then be appraised themselves (an *unreasonable* concern; an *irrational* outburst of anger; *powerful* sentiments; etc]. The disembodied feelings of ‘concern’ in this text are firstly directed towards nominalised judgements of ‘social esteem’, viz., *the traditional strengths of adaptability and resilience of the Hong Kong*

people. Because all these ‘feelings’ are nominalised, the author has the whole transitivity system to play with (Martin, 1999).

But what is being evaluated here? The disembodied *concern*? Those who are apparently ‘feeling’ this concern? *The traditional strengths of adaptability and resilience*? *The Hong Kong people*? Their “attitudes”? *The bubble economy*? *The get rich quick mindset*? *The strong work ethic*? The “belief” of the (by now) ubiquitous *some in the community*?

The answer to all of these questions is: yes and no.

At a particular level, all these elements are given evaluative attributes, explicit, inscribed, intertextual, and implicit. But what is propagating here is an *overall evaluation* of *Desirability* for elements of a “progressive”, reformationist, economic rationalist discourse, with which we all ought to be familiar by now, and, implicitly, of the *Importance* of adhering to the values and imperatives of that discourse. In short, the elements for which an overall evaluation is being propagated here *do not even appear explicitly in the text*. What gets smuggled in here is the *Desirability* of a fundamentally conservative worldview held by the authors, who appear to be passing ‘judgement’ on the eroded moral proclivities of Hong Kong’s entire working population, as well as their (unreasonable) *expectations* of the government (among other things). If this were a concrete, unmodalised construal of what is the subtext here, it might read something like:

We think that the people of Hong Kong don’t want to work hard any more because their morals have been eroded by too much of the easy life, and so now they expect the government to look after them. That is unreasonable and undesirable. They need to get back to their old work ethic and learn that the government cannot be responsible for them.

So again, I immediately encountered a problem with the effects of evaluative interplay, with *evaluative propagation*. In some senses, it is not a dissimilar problem posed by the analysis of the MUA text. My working hypothesis at present, which seems to be useful, is that the analysis of evaluations in texts is best organised around the concepts of *predication and propagation*.

Predication, propagation, evaluation, and grammatical status

The difference between analysing values in language from a “predication” perspective and a “propagation” perspective is the grammatical and contextual levels at which analyses are conducted. Lexical resources deployed in evaluative *predication* inscribe an element of the discourse – a Process, Circumstance, or Participant – with a particular value or Quality; the evaluation is *predicated of*, or attributed to, a specific element. Consider the following highlighted attributes:

As economic activity has globalised, particularly in the financial and services sectors, a few **major** cities - world cities - have become **vital** centres for managing and co-ordinating economic activity on a **global** basis. Furthermore, **successful** world cities appear to share a number of common characteristics. (Hong Kong Vision, w. 5,235, major.cnc)

The predications here are of a specific order: they fall under the broad, fuzzy semantic category of *Importance* (shades of *Desirability* are also present). They are attributes of world cities, which are *major*, *vital*, and *successful*, centres that operate on a *global* basis. In other words, they are *Important* because they perform *Necessary* and *Powerful* functions in our “brave new world”. Here, in this secondary set of implicit values, we see the effects of evaluative propagation. The values predicated of particular elements in the discourse propagate other values of a more abstract order. They do so within and across the *propositional content* of the text. Highlighting the propositional content:

As economic activity has globalised, particularly in the financial and services sectors, **<a few major cities - world cities -> have become <vital centres for managing and co-ordinating economic activity on a global basis>.** Furthermore, **successful world cities appear to share a number of common characteristics.** (Hong Kong Vision, w: 5,235, major.cnc)

The first proposition put forward here is that a few cities now control and direct [*manage* and *coordinate*] global economic activities. For this reason they are *powerful, successful, necessary*, and therefore *Important*. Or, to rephrase the evaluation propagated here in the broadest possible terms, it says: It is *Important* that global economic activity is managed and coordinated by a few major cities (cf. Lemke, 1998).

As Lemke shows, and as is further evidenced by my own empirical analyses (see, eg, attachments 1 and 2 *It is X that; It is X to*), at the grammatical level of propositions and proposals, the evaluative resources are limited. My assertion is that, as texts are built up at more extended grammatical and intertextual levels, they propagate even more limited, but far more abstract, dimensions of value. In the case of the policy texts I am analysing, the evaluative dimensions that propagate across whole texts are those of *Desirability* and/or *Importance*. Evaluative stances become “syllogised” as major evaluative premises and thus become the rationale for action. And not surprisingly: that is the purpose of policy-making institutions, they are ‘macro-proposing institutions (JR Martin, personal conversation, June 7, 2000).

The resources of ‘appraisal’ (Martin, 1998) are essentially resources that realise an evaluation of a particular part of the discourse itself; they are attributes of a particular order and can only be predicated of elements that are present in the text. However, when further grammaticalised, for instance in propositions and proposals, the elements of the text and their explicit evaluations take part in a “syntax” of values that propagate other values, the most abstract and exhaustive of which are *Importance* and *Desirability*. Propagated values are values realised beyond the level of the elements in the discourse. They are grammatically propositional and “syllogistic”, and fall under seven broad categories, identified in Lemke (1998). These are listed in *fig. 1* below:

I want to add another category to those identified by Lemke (1998), those of *Utility*, or *Usefulness*, and in the case of proposals, *Difficulty*. The short reason that these are needed is that they appear in the policy texts I am analysing and they are semantically different classes from the seven identified by Lemke. It may be that the category of *Usefulness* is more evident in the policy corpus that I am presenting here because of demands upon the authors to reconcile interests according to practical, pragmatic value systems.⁸ These categories are most often associated with proposals, *Difficulty* is unique to proposals.

In the instance of the above sentences which construe the *Importance* of “world cities”, the primary functional method of propagation is ‘evaluative cohesion’, or ‘[c]o-evaluation, along the same dimension (and more definitively if also similar in polarity and degree, but this is not necessary)’ which creates ‘cohesive links between separated elements that are not readily construed by cohesive devices’ (Lemke, 1998).

The example I have given here is a fairly straightforward example of evaluative cohesion. Positive degrees of *Importance* are construed throughout. At the predication level, ‘appraisal’ resources of ‘judgement’ and ‘appreciation’ are deployed in the terms *successful, major*, and *vital*. The “things”

⁸ In ethics, this category would correspond to the Utilitarian ethical stance; i.e. “the greatest good for the greatest number”.

appraised – *world cities* – are phenomena specific to a functioning *global* economy which “do” *Important* processes, namely manage and co-ordinate *economic activity on a global basis*. The Processes buried in the attributive nominal group, *vital centres for managing and co-ordinating economic activity on a global basis*, attribute an enormous degree of *Power* to the *world cities* being described here: the claim is made that these cities fairly much control global economic activity. The value resources located on the level of abstraction at which *Power* appears here is of an order between the direct lexical resources available at the predicative level of *appraisal*, and those at the most abstract and broad propagational level of *Importance* (Lemke, 1998). And these middle-range values occupy quite a different and distinct order of abstraction. They are, for instance, unsuited to evaluating a proposition, but may appear as direct lexical appraisals of elements in the discourse (as may the most abstract and broad categories of *Desirability* and *Importance*).

For instance, it is not sensible to say, using Lemke’s probe, “It is very *Powerful* that John is coming”. But we may say that “John is very *Powerful*”, just as we may say, “That is a *Powerful* piece of music”. But the order of abstraction at which *Power* is construed in the Hong Kong policy text clearly lies “above” predication and “below” propagation. In this sense, the process of value propagation is *fundamentally relational*. Further, the level of abstraction, which is dependent on the grammatical and contextual status of the textual elements and their predicates, changes the evaluative status of the attribution *Powerful*. For instance, the statement, “John is very *Powerful*”, construes an ‘appreciative’ of John. The statement, “Beethoven’s fifth is a *Powerful* piece of music” construes an ‘affective’ appraisal of the music. But in the policy text about *world cities*, *Power* appears as a judgemental evaluation (the element is endowed with ‘social esteem’ and ‘social sanction’) which is at a level “below” the propagational value of *Importance*. In this case, *Power* is construed by the relationship between the processes buried in the nominal group [*managing and co-ordinating*] and the scope of these processes [*economic activity on a global basis*]. World cities are *Powerful* because they control the world economy. Therefore they are *Important*.

The difference between predication and propagation has clear implications for the analysis of evaluation in texts. It suggests that values are construed *on at least four levels of abstraction* that are dependent on the grammatical status of the evaluative resources being deployed, the elements being evaluated, and the relationships between all of these. To make matters more complex, appraisals get nominalised and appraised, as do the relationships themselves.

All this implies a functional and relational grammar of values that is at least as complex as the tense system (Halliday, 1994); which, indeed, appears to be influenced strongly by the the tense system itself (*see below*); which functions simultaneously at different levels analagous to the textual, interpersonal, and ideational metafunctions; and which is subject to the same metafunctional complexities associated with metaredundancy, with the various “levels” or “dimensional metafunctions” peculiar to evaluations interacting with each other, and, of course, with the social, generic, and discursive contexts of the textual instance (Lemke, 1995; Martin, 2000, p. 161). It also implies an hierarchical grammatical and semantic organisation of values, which, I argue, at the most abstract level of the policy genre, invariably propagate degrees of *Desirability* and *Importance* upon which imperatives for action are developed.

I can only briefly describe some of the aspects of what appears to me to be an enormous and complex system. I will do so using examples from a 1.3 million word corpus drawn from local, state, national, and supranational policy texts about the impact of new technologies on human societies.

First, though, I will hazard an hierarchical arrangement of evaluative abstraction with corresponding semantic categories, all of which might appear as predicates of elements in the text, only some of which can be propagated at the middle-range of abstraction, and two of which propagate at the most abstract level over the course of a policy text.

1. The most abstract semantic level of propagated values: *Desirability* and *Importance* which are mutually mediating in the process of propagation;
2. At an almost equally abstract level: *Warrantability* (Probability); *Comprehensibility* (Obviousness), *Usuality* (Expectability), *Utility* (Usefulness), *Difficulty*, *Normativity* (Appropriateness), *Humorousness*, all of which can mediate, support, and propagate the semantic categories of evaluation in 1;
3. Mid-range semantic categories that can be evaluated in terms of the categories in 1 and 2 above, but [only the values in 1 and 2 propagate at the clause level or beyond]: *Powerful*, *Moral*, *Intelligent*, *Lawful*, *Expensive*, *Reasonable* (sensible), *Normal*, *Credible*, *Complex* (*This level is very incomplete and not well-theorised as yet. It requires a synthesis of historical and empirical work. That is, I have yet to distil the categories from the above historical work and test them against the corpus*).
4. Lexical resources that directly construe an evaluation for an element in the text. These are most conveniently organised by Martin (2000, p. 145) under the headings of *Affect*, *Judgement*, and *Appreciation*. These resources of ‘appraisal’ are directly inscribed in the text and directly affected by the resources of *amplification* and *engagement* (p. 145). Resources of appraisal are directly predicated of elements – Processes, Participants, Circumstances, and Qualities – in the text.

Returning to the corpus to see the relationship between what is predicated of elements in the text, and what is propagated by the relationships between these elements:

Technology is the **most important** determinant of these factors⁹, because technology and the associated business processes are the **principal** determinant of the sources of **value-added** and the [centres of **market power**]. **Major** shifts in the **underlying** technology of an industry are accompanied by **major** shifts in these sources and centres, and a redistribution of the **benefits** of economic activity. These changes affect **different** industries in **different** ways. There is a **close** relationship between **economic value**, **economic power** and **industry structure**. Industry participants structure their operations in order to internalise the activities which generate value and to occupy [the industry positions which *confer economic power*]. As the sources and centres shift, industry structure will also shift as industry participants restructure their operations in order to capture **new commercial opportunities**. (noieconv, w: 3,956, impotech.cnc)

The *factors* referred to in the first sentence are actually questions: *who creates economic value?* [sources] and *who captures economic value?* [centres] (noieconv, w: 3,956, impotech.cnc). Here we find a complex arrangement of predicates. The authors are describing the constituent elements that determine the answers to these two questions. Explicit evaluations are made for technology here: it is the *most important* factor in the creation and capture of economic value because it is the source of *value-added*¹⁰ and, if I read this correctly, the means by which the centralisation of *market*

⁹ The factors referred to are: ‘who creates economic value?’ and ‘who captures economic value?’.

¹⁰ This nominalised deployment of *value-added* is not atypical of the genre, even though it might look like a grammatical “mistake”.

power is determined. Technology is *Important* because it determines *economic power* by placing industry participants in central positions within an *industry structure*. Interestingly, we see implicit evidence of the author's sensitivity to different 'species' of value (Perry, 1916). *Economic value* is differentiated from other types of value. It is also differentiated from, and placed in various relationships with, *economic power*, *industry structure*, *new commercial opportunities*, and *industry positions which confer economic power*. We can also see here that the concept of "enclosure" is still alive and well: those who create economic value [*sources*] are not necessarily the same as those who "capture" economic value [*centres*]. Again, the tendency towards emphasising the power of economic centres, implying a process of increasing economic centralisation, is evident in this passage. It relates evaluations for *power*, *importance*, and *value* to the other broad semantic category of *Desirability*: technology is the means by which *industry participants ... capture new commercial opportunities*, an inherently *Desirable* outcome in this genre.¹¹ In other words, technology enables economic centralisation, which, as we have seen, is both *Desirable* and *Important* because it is a *Powerful* position.

Propagated value as syllogistic

'Syntactic propagation' occurs when an evaluative stance towards an element in the clause transfers its evaluation to another element (Lemke, 1998). Where syntactic propagation is concerned, we can exclude 'explicit evaluators', 'appraisal resources, that can typically do this, such as attitudinal Attributes/Epithets and auxiliary modalisers', and 'there are still a host of other phenomena' that propagate evaluation. Interestingly, 'the Polarity of these evaluations can be reversed during propagation'. However, even though such propagation can be analysed without the resources of appraisal, we need not ignore them. As Martin notes, 'what counts as appraisal depends on the field of discourse. Because of this, ideational meanings that do not use evaluative lexis can be used to evoke appreciation, as with AFFECT and JUDGEMENT' (2000, p. 161). In the following passage from a Greek technology policy statement, an overall evaluation for the *Importance* (Necessity)¹² of institutional change propagates across positive and negative evaluations of *Desirability* where the effects of new technology are concerned:

The **initial** tendency for a **decline** in the demand for labour as a result of the introduction of **labour-saving** technology is counteracted by the **increased** demand for products and services that follows the **higher** productivity, **lower** prices, and the creation of **new** markets for the **new** products and services. In order for **sufficient** jobs to be created, it is **necessary** to establish a policy framework for the labour, product and service markets which facilitates such **dynamic** adjustment, encourages the **necessary new** investments, and prepares the labour force for the **new** skills that will prevail in the job market. **New** technologies are a source of **new** employment opportunities but at the same time create the need for **difficult** adjustments. Experience shows that policies which focus on safeguarding **existing** jobs in **declining** sectors and professions at all costs cause **significant** delay [in the renewal of the industrial fabric] with **adverse** consequences for **healthy** companies. It is therefore **necessary** to establish an **institutional** framework for the labour market where the restructuring of jobs and skills can take place **faster** and **easier**. Employment policy in the Information Society aims at creating a **flexible** institutional framework for the labour market and is accompanied by initiatives for training and the **upgrading** of skills. (Greece1, w: 20,857, oportux.cnc)

¹¹ In the corpus of 1.3 million words, derivatives of the word "opportunity" appear 1038 times, at *all* times with desirable attribution.

¹² *Necessity* could be viewed as an expression of *Normativity*, but in this case it is not.

Here, the syntactic propagation of *Necessity* ‘depend[s] on a single variable which must be assigned intertextually’. In this case, it is the high degree of *Desirability* for *new employment opportunities*, which is set in evaluative relationships to *a decline in the demand for labour, sufficient jobs, and the restructuring of jobs and skills*.¹³

To establish the evaluative significance of the “new employment opportunities” variable here, it is necessary to identify the elements that are most explicitly inscribed with values in the above example. Technology is construed here as having both positive and negative effects upon society. We are told that *labour-saving technology* tends to reduce *the demand for labour* when it is first “introduced”. But then this is offset by *increased demand for products and services*, the result of *higher productivity, lower prices, and new markets for new products and services*. All these outcomes are construed as unquestionable benefits of new technologies (which is quite false on all counts in the current climate, but never mind that).

Once they are given, the “facts” of technological development are transformed into policy imperatives through a construal of irrealis *Inevitability* (this is a case in which the tense system is foregrounded as an evaluative resource): *In order for sufficient jobs to be created, it is necessary to establish a policy framework that facilitates dynamic adjustment, encourages necessary new investments, and prepares the labour force for new skills that will prevail in the job market*. Then we are told that *new technologies* create *new employment opportunities*, and, it seems, the reader is supposed to infer that new technology is *Desirable* for this reason, even though we have already been told that new technologies reduce the demand for labour, and are in fact the cause of all the change that people have suddenly to deal with. The contradictory evaluative tensions between new technologies being responsible for creating new job *opportunities* [as opposed to actual jobs] versus their being responsible for destroying *existing jobs and professions* is resolved in a number of ways.

First, *increased demand; higher productivity; lower prices; and new markets, products, and services* are attributed to technological advances. The prospect of protecting *existing jobs in declining sectors* is dismissed, based on the dead facts of someone or other’s *experience* (of course, we are not told whose). The decrepit state of the Greek economy is acknowledged in the implied need for *a renewal of the industrial fabric*,¹⁴ thus doubly reinforcing the futility of maintaining the institutional status quo. Next, the image of *healthy companies* is set against itself to imply “sick” ones, thus situating *declining sectors and professions* and “sick” industries in a burdensom relationship with *healthy companies*. The sum of all these evaluations, positive and negative in Polarity, is *Necessity* – the necessity for *difficult adjustments; for training and the upgrading of skills; and for a policy framework that is oriented towards creating a flexible institutional framework for the labour market*. In other words, employment policy is to be oriented towards the taken-for-granted assumption that:

It is *Important* for individuals and institutions to adjust to the negative effects of technology because, overall, the effects of technology are both *Inevitable* and *Desirable*

¹³ In other discursive universes, ‘the ultimate goal of labour’, and of technological development in general, ‘is to end labour’ (White, 1931), not to create more demands *for labour*, nor to deprive people of their means of existence. Such is the paradox of *labour-saving technology*.

¹⁴ The terminology, *the industrial fabric*, appears to be unique to Greece. At least that is the case in the current corpus.

Their negative effects, as well as people's adjustments to these, are also *Inevitable*. Although the technologies themselves, as well as their effects, carry evaluations for positive and negative degrees of *Desirability*, they are overall a positive, *Desirable* force, the key desirable element that promotes their *Desirability* being *new employment opportunities*. Without these opportunities, there would be no solution to the problems of technology identified by the author [a decline in employment brought about by new technologies]. Technology would, rather, appear solely as the *cause* of economic decline and unemployment.

For this reason, the positive evaluation for *new employment opportunities* dominates the evaluation that propagates through the Greek text. It transfers its high positive evaluation intertextually to other elements to offset the negative effects of technology, the most significant of which is the loss of jobs; the adjustments that need to be made by both “the labour market” [*retraining, more flexibility, upgrading skills*] and policy makers [*the need for new employment policies, the need for a new institutional framework*]; and reinforcing the *Importance* (Necessity) of these adjustments. For reasons that become obvious in the above example, ‘a reader needs intertextual knowledge of the writer’s probable assignment of value polarity to key well-known elements in order to trace out the evaluations in the text’ (Lemke, 1998). In the above example, ‘heteroglossic opposition’ can only be established through intertextual knowledge of late-twentieth century attitudes towards “technology”, the “economy”, and “employment” to discern the evaluative polarity and *Importance* of the key element in the text [*new employment opportunities*].

We can be seen that there is a kind of evaluative “syllogising” going on through the evaluations in this text. The evaluations of particular elements in the text do not merely or obviously “add up” to an overall evaluation for the benefits of technological change, even though we can see the “pluses” and “minuses” of introducing technology. The evaluations are not merely heaped one upon the other, but are set in opposition to one another, and at times, to themselves, in a kind of implied *sic et non*. Furthermore, the resources of engagement and amplification are deployed to moderate between positive and negative aspects of new technologies. Following is a step-by-step analysis that highlights positive and negative degrees of *Desirability*

The initial **tendency for a decline in the demand for labour** as a result of the introduction of labour-saving technology

THE “DECLINE IN THE DEMAND FOR LABOUR” CAUSED BY NEW TECHNOLOGIES IS NOT CONSTRUED AS A FACT, BUT RATHER AS A “TENDENCY”, A NOMINALISED FORM OF *PROBABILITY*. BUT A KIND OF “FACT” DOES FOLLOW THE *POSSIBILITY* OF A DECLINE IN JOBS. THE FACT IS THAT “LABOUR-SAVING TECHNOLOGY” IS THE PRIMARY FORCE IN ALL THIS: IT *RESULTS* IN A NUMBER OF THINGS, ONE OF WHICH IS *THE INITIAL TENDENCY* TO DESTROY JOBS [INTER ALIA, *EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES*]. THIS NEGATIVE POSSIBILITY IS OFFSET BY THE FOLLOWING, WHICH IS CONSTRUED IN A FAR MORE POSITIVE WAY:

is counteracted by the increased demand for products and services that follows the higher productivity, lower prices, and the creation of new markets for the new products and services.

HERE A STRING OF POSITIVE “FACTS” – CONSTRUED AS UNMODALISED, UNQUESTIONABLE EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY – IS COUNTERPOSED TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT *DEMAND* FOR SOME JOBS WILL BE LOST. THESE POSITIVE FACTS ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF *DEMAND* OF A DIFFERENT KIND. *DEMAND* FOR JOBS MAY DECREASE, BUT *DEMAND* FOR **NEW** PRODUCTS AND SERVICES WILL COME FROM THE **NEW** MARKETS THAT TECHNOLOGY INEVITABLY CREATES. NEGATIVE *DEMAND* IS COUNTERPOSED TO POSITIVE *DEMAND*.

In order for sufficient jobs to be created, it is necessary to establish a policy framework for the labour, product and service markets which facilitates such dynamic adjustment, encourages the necessary new investments, and prepares the labour force for the new skills that will prevail in the job market.

NOW THIS POSITIVE DEMAND IS PROBLEMATISED: THERE NEEDS TO BE ADJUSTMENTS IN POLICY IF THE NEW OPPORTUNITIES OF TECHNOLOGY, PREVIOUSLY ATTRIBUTED AS UNMITIGATED *EFFECTS*, ARE TO BE REALISED. A POLICY FRAMEWORK THAT IS DESIGNED TO FACILITATE THE POSITIVE EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY BECOMES *NECESSARY*. SO, WHAT WERE CONSTRUED AS INEVITABLE EFFECTS IN THE PREVIOUS SENTENCE NOW BECOMES, IMPLICITLY, *OPPORTUNITIES* FOR BENEFITS TO BE REALISED. INEVITABILITY IS TRANSFERRED FROM THE EXOGENOUS EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY TO THE ENDOGENOUS *NECESSITY* FOR A *POLICY FRAMEWORK* THAT RESPONDS TO THE EFFECTS THAT TECHNOLOGY HAS CREATED ELSEWHERE.

New technologies are a source of new employment opportunities but at the same time create the need for difficult adjustments.

HERE, THE CENTRAL *SIC ET NON* PROPOSAL ON WHICH THE WHOLE EVALUATIVE SYLLOGISM OF THE TEXT RESTS IS SET OUT EXPLICITLY. *NECESSITY*, WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED BASED ON THE POSITIVE EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY, IS TRANSFERRED TO *DIFFICULT ADJUSTMENTS* BECAUSE THE *NEW EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES* ARE CONSTRUED AS GIVEN FACTS THAT FOLLOW ON FROM THE *SIC ET NON* CONSTRUCTION IN THE FIRST SENTENCE – THE BENEFITS OF TECHNOLOGY [WHICH ARE INEVITABILITIES] FAR OUTWEIGH THE NEGATIVES [WHICH ARE ONLY TENDENCIES]. THEREFORE, ADJUSTMENTS TO TECHNOLOGY AND ITS BENEFITS ARE *NECESSARY*. POLICY THAT ENCOURAGES ADJUSTMENT IS THE NATURAL SOLUTION.

Experience shows that policies which focus on safeguarding existing jobs in declining sectors and professions at all costs cause significant delay in the renewal of the industrial fabric with adverse consequences for healthy companies.

JUST IN CASE ANY READER THINKS THAT THE DESTRUCTIVE EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS CAN BE MODERATED BY POLICY, THE AUTHORS TROT OUT ANTI-PROTECTIONIST RHETORIC AND ASSUMPTIONS TO DISPEL ANY SUCH POSSIBILITY. THE OVERALL RESULT WOULD BE TO PROTECT THE SICK AT THE EXPENSE OF THE HEALTHY. THIS IS A BARELY IMPLICIT STATEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL OR ECONOMIC EUGENICS (CF. HERBERT SPENCER). IF *HEALTHY*, AND PRESUMABLY *NEW*, INDUSTRIES ARE HAMPERED BY PROTECTIONIST POLICIES, THE INDUSTRIAL FABRIC WILL CONTINUE TO DECAY.

It is therefore necessary to establish an institutional framework for the labour market where the restructuring of jobs and skills can take place faster and easier. Employment policy in the Information Society aims at creating a flexible institutional framework for the labour market and is accompanied by initiatives for training and the upgrading of skills. (Greece1, w: 20,857, oportux.cnc)

HERE WE HAVE THE END OF THIS EVALUATIVE CHAIN WHICH, AS WE SEE, PROPAGATES *NECESSITY* FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM, WHICH IS A FUNCTION OF POLICY ACCORDING TO THE TEXT. THE *DESIRABILITY* OF *NEW EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES*, COUNTERPOSED TO THE *UNDESIRABILITY* OF UNEMPLOYMENT, AND THE *IMPORTANCE* OF RESTRUCTURING JOBS AND SKILLS TO ADAPT TO THE EXOGENOUS DEMANDS CREATED BY NEW TECHNOLOGY, THE PROVINCE OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITY, IS TRANSLATED INTO *NECESSITY* FOR POLICY MAKERS.

In brief, taking the form of the deductive syllogism, we can express the evaluative logic of the Greek text in three syllogisms (obviously there are more, but these will do for the present purposes):

A

Major premise: All new employment opportunities are *Desirable*

Minor premise: New technologies are the source of new employment opportunities

Deduction: New technologies are therefore *Desirable*.

B

Major premise: All new markets, services, and products are *Desirable*

Minor premise: New technologies create new markets, services, and products.

Deduction: New technologies are therefore *Desirable*.

C

Major premise: New technologies are *Desirable*.

Qualifying major premise: They require people to have new skills.

Deduction: It is therefore *Important* (Necessary) that people gain new skills.

At this point, if we accept the validity of the premises, it becomes a matter of mere common sense that education, typically a function and responsibility of the modern state, becomes oriented towards employment, and that employment policy becomes oriented towards re-education of the population if the Greek economy is to reap the benefits of new technologies. Herein lies one imperative for *creating a flexible institutional framework for the labour market*. We must assume that this refers to and includes the institutions and policies that pertain to education, employment, trade, industry, *and* technology. In short, the claims made here for technology and its effects become the basis for restructuring the entire Greek state, starting with the perceptions about the purpose of the education system.¹⁵

Other features of the policy discourse including strenuous use of the tense system and conflated historical roles

In its broadest sense, the function of techno-corporatist discourse is identical to that of advertising: it is firstly used to *sell* something, i.e. the need for changes in people's behaviour. Thus, it is always used to *maximise profits* for somebody. Most often, the people who use this discourse make a virtue of its "profit maximisation" function, and so the profit motive is rarely hidden –in fact, that is often its main (or only) recommendation. Because people use it to maximise profits for somebody, it *makes somebody more powerful*, and this is its primary function: it is used to sell, create, produce, define, and maintain *power*. In this sense, it is self-valorising: it adds surplus value to itself the more quickly and widely it is circulated. It mixes the language of business - corporate managerialism - with those of theocracy and technocracy, thus providing a potent mixture of historically successful modes of domination. The heteroglossic relations in the discourse are usually structured thus:

1. **client** \hat{U} **patron** [*action*: sale/choice - *relationship*: the patron speaks on behalf of the client];
2. **beneficiary** \hat{U} **benefactor** [*action*: give gifts/mercy/permission - *relationship*: the benefactor speaks on behalf of the beneficiary];
3. **employee** \hat{U} **manager** [*action*: order/organise/control/coordinate/plan - *relationship*: the manager speaks on behalf of the employee];
4. **expert** \hat{U} **idea** [*action*: innovate/transform/inform/define/quantify - *relationship*: the expert speaks on behalf of the idea. Examples include legal expert \leftrightarrow law; engineer \leftrightarrow technology; bureaucrat \leftrightarrow policy, etc];

¹⁵ It is worth noting that the neoliberal ideology, along with that of neo-classical economics, explicitly rails against central government controls (Hayek, ***). As we can see here in the Greek text, adherence to free trade anti-protectionist dogma, and to techno-fetishism (technology as the *prima causae* of social change), seems to lead to an increased need for centralised control. Such are the contradictions of neoliberal freedom.

5. priestŪ god [*action*: dispense salvation/justice/fate/predictions/divine law/power/received wisdom - *relationship*: the priest speaks on behalf of an omnipresent, extrajudicial god].

These voices are most often mixed in M3; they rarely appear alone. These relations need not imply ‘projection’ (Halliday, 1994, p. 219). Rather, they are the heteroglossic social voices embedded within M3. They have been historically overlaid, as techniques of social control, one upon the other. The form of language that the convergence of these three modes of social domination takes - corporate managerialism, theocracy, and technocracy - is neither pre-modern, modern, nor postmodern: it is *totalitarian*. M3 is characteristically shot through with blatant contradictions, closest to that which Orwell (1949/1981) termed *doublethink*. It attempts to grasp huge, abstract social trajectories in neologisms and euphemisms. Those are its main features. I will point out these and other regularities in the following analyses, at the same time showing how SFL can inform sociological and anthropological analyses of the political field, a specific class of socially significant, well-defined *doings*.

This analysis highlights tense and shows how some of the historical discourses outlined above are realised in contemporary technocratic discourse. Note the inclusion of the “normal people” discourse of eugenics, which is construed in what I think is a pernicious and threatening way.

Text: Miller, R., Michalski, W., & Stevens, B. (1998). *The promises and Perils of 21st Century technology: An overview of the issues* (pp. 7-32). In Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] (1998).

Twenty-five years from now, after more than five decades of development, the microprocessor, information technologies in general, and networks **will probably have penetrated** [every aspect of human activity]. Many parts of the world **<carrier> [will be]** wired, responsive and interactive **<attribute>**. Beyond simply accelerating the pace of change or reducing the cost of many current activities, the use of these high-performance digital tools **opens up** [the possibility of profound transformations]. (p. 10)

- 1) **will probably have penetrated:** Here we see a mild example of the complex tense structures demanded by priestly technocratic predictions. We have past [*have penetrated*] in future [*will*], partially modalised by *probably*. The past-in-future construction construes the likelihood of the future state of affairs as “a done deal”, regardless of the modalisation. The choice of a material process [*penetrated*] sets up the Range function for the nominal group Actor in this clause [*the microprocessor, information technologies in general, and networks*]. The range specifies the scope of the process (Halliday, 1994, p. 146). In this case, the range is *every aspect of of human activity*. Clearly, the authors are making some ambitious predictions, not dissimilar in scope from prophecy. As far as we humans are concerned, technology is a profoundly transformative, all-encompassing, *exogenously acting* phenomenon that will affect everything we do (seemingly regardless of *what* we do!).
- 2) **will be:** The intensive-attributive function is typical of technocratic predictions and descriptions (McKenna & Graham, 2000). In this vision, *Many parts of the world* is the carrier of some rather vague attributes. It is as if, today, many parts of the world were not already *wired, responsive and interactive*. The act of predicting what already exists is an intrinsically sacramental form of *renaming* (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 120).

3) **opens up:** Here is an example of process metaphor. The apparently abstract-material process functions to define a range *beyond* that of *simply accelerating the pace of change or reducing the cost of many current activities*. The use of these high-performance digital tools is an nominalised, abstract, process-like Actor that exceeds mere change by opening up the *possibility* of further change [substitutes signifies, promises, brings, creates, portends, exposes, reveals, etc]. But these are not just any old changes, these changes are *profound*. The circularity of the discourse is evident here. The abstract Actor creates, not merely the speed of change, but the *profound* nature of change itself: it changes the nature of change from simple to profound. That the use of these technologies will speed up change and lower costs is given. No other possibility is entertained.

These few sentences are fairly simple examples that highlight some of the basic features of the discourse and its conflation of historical roles: its intention to sell (the benefits of technology, or of “socio-technical dynamism” in this case); its prophetic, priestly, and visionary nature (the world will be thus; such and such phenomena *will be*); its affinity with technology; its circularity (using technology will change *change*); its dependence on grammatical metaphor of an extremely abstract and ambitiously grasping nature (*all areas of human activity*; *Many parts of the world*; *the use of these high-performance digital tools*); and, especially, its reliance on authority. This is the key aspect of M3. An “unauthorised” person could not make such claims with much credibility, and these are mild in terms of the rest of the text.

The strenuous demands of authoritative, unrealistic descriptions of an inevitable future state upon Processes is best exemplified by the central verbal group in the following 62-word sentence:

Virtual robots with fairly narrowly defined tasks, a type of expert software, will have reached the point of being able to track and respond to [many human needs, from the banal capacity of a networked toaster to identify users and recall their preferences to the more advanced functionality of e-mail screening, comparison shopping and assembling/tracking a person's customised learning “adventures”]. (p. 11)

The effect of the central verbal group in this sentence is to set the tense system spiralling back and forth in a helical manner, from future to past to present and back again, to construe an imaginary phenomenon as if it had already happened in some bygone future. The historical heteroglot of authoritarian voices can also be identified here. This is a comfortably consistent heteroglossic stew of authoritative statements: there are priestly predictions; experts expressing ideas and explaining them; the benefactor's voice speaks condescendingly about the *needs* of people that will be catered to by *virtual robots*, a kind of mechanical knowledge slave; and the homey familiarity of a household appliance sales pitch are overlayed and embedded within each other, thus collapsing the authoritative voices of the whole of human history within a single sentence. And, this is without mentioning the poverty of the OECD's ‘vision’ of what might constitute *human needs*. But these words are mere padding for the hard sell.

The text proceeds in a very similar manner to explain the benefits of genetic engineering: ‘By 2005, after fifteen years of intense activity, scientists should know [the full DNA sequence of a *typical* man or woman]’ (p. 12)¹⁶; its uses: ‘Biotechnology applications are likely to pervade [most areas of activity] in the next quarter-century’ (p. 13); and the risks of new technologies: They

¹⁶ I have highlighted “typical” here to show the assumptions that the authors tend to make about people. Other such epithets include ‘prototypical’ and so on.

<carrier/Actor> **could pose threats that will be** [both powerful and difficult to control]
 <attribute/Range>' (p. 14). This last sentence is an interesting construction because the verbal group highlights two evenly mixed functions. It conflates an abstract material [*could pose threats: i.e. could threaten*] with an unmodalised future intensive-attributive [*that will be*]. Thus, it actually projects a threat on behalf of technology's potential by attributing the *possibility* of material consequences as Range, although the "who gets done to?" question is left unanswered. Another choice for this sentence could have been: *They could pose powerful threats that will be difficult to control [for ...?]* **OR** *They could threaten to be powerful and difficult to control [for ...?]*. Whichever way this is translated, technology is construed, as is usual in M3 texts, as an exogenous, determining force of nature that *someone or something* needs to tame and/or nurture, usually the policy unit putting the policy together.

The hard sell comes after the authors describe several models of what future global governance might look like, especially as they relate to facilitating 'socio-technical dynamism' (pp. 15-26). The authors highlight a clear imperative here: 'Reaping the rewards and reducing the dangers generated by technological advances **depend on** [a complex interaction with underlying economic, social and political conditions]' (p. 15). Here is another example of process metaphor [depend on = requires, needs, demands, has to have, implies, etc]. It is actually a proposal pretending to be a proposition. The abstract-material phrasal verb (Halliday, 1994, pp. 207-210), *depend on*, which functions firstly as a circumstantial-relational process here, allows the nominal/verbal group Head (Act), which functions here as a nominal group Thing, to take up centre stage, as it were, whilst concealing the passivity of the sentence and its authoritarian imperative. A slightly more concrete translation of this thinly veiled imperative might be: *A complex interaction [by someone or something] with underlying economic, social and political conditions [somewhere] will allow [someone or something] to reap the rewards and reduce the dangers of technological advances*. This "someone or something" who wishes to interact, reap rewards, and reduce danger must read on to see what such *complex interaction* might entail, and what the qualifying *economic, social and political conditions* might be. This extremely compressed sentence is a well-disguised authoritarian proposal: "If you want to benefit you must engage". It leads, inevitably, to the self-valorising purpose that inheres in the language and logic of the political field.

I have outlined just a few of the interesting (and for me, often frightening) features of contemporary technocratic discourse when seen in the context of the history of value as a technical concept. One of the main difficulties of the approach is that it is so broad and vast an area, and rarely (of course) are the values made explicit. Even when they are, they seem to be a sheen that conceals something rather unpleasant. What must be said is that the *predication and propagation* approach I am proposing here is at a transitional stage of development, although I hope the small part I have presented will spark some critical interest for the reader. I have also yet to incorporate in the historical material the perspectives of media technology theorists like Harold Innis, Marshall McLuhan, and Lynn White Jr. They have some interesting things to say about value. But the critical point of this paper is that today, language is more a source of perceptions of value than ever before. A comprehensive linguistics of value is still a long way off, but I hope to make a significant contribution to this exciting field of interdisciplinary study.

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